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Abstract 
I hand-collect non-GAAP earnings disclosures made by New Zealand firms to consider whether 
the characteristics of disclosers are consistent with informative or opportunistic (turning up the 
noise) disclosure incentives. I find evidence that both types of incentives are important. 
Commentators frequently suggest that firms informatively disclose non-GAAP earnings because 
IFRS fails to adequately capture underlying performance. I find that IFRS is associated with an 
increased probability of non-GAAP earnings disclosure; and an increased probability that 
disclosers will provide high-quality reconciliations, whereas opportunistically-linked firm 
characteristics are negatively associated with reconciliation quality. One interpretation is that this 
corroborates commentators’ arguments. The Financial Market Authority provides guidance on 
the best disclosure practices; however, I fail to find evidence that opportunistically-linked firm 
characteristics are less likely to shape non-GAAP disclosure after the introduction of this 
guidance. Conversely, this guidance is positively associated with reconciliation quality which 
could imply that some latent reduction in opportunism has occurred. Some informatively-linked 
firm characteristics are positively associated with reconciliation quality, while others are 
negatively associated. Evidence suggests that the emphasis placed on non-GAAP earnings is a 
function of both informativeness and opportunism. This suggests that any regulatory restrictions 
constraining the disclosure or emphasis of non-GAAP earnings or demanding high-quality 
reconciliations (‘calling noise control’) would be likely to restrict the practices of both 
informative and opportunistic disclosers. Lastly, while there is limited evidence that the decision 
to disclose well-defined, commonly-used non-GAAP earnings metrics (EB metrics) has the 
potential to be opportunistically motivated, evidence suggests these measures are 
opportunistically emphasised. This warrants concern about the use of all forms of non-GAAP 
earnings.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction  
 
In recent years, a burgeoning emphasis has been placed on non-GAAP earnings (hereafter, 
NGEs).
1
 One potential explanation is that NGEs are more useful to investors than statutory 
earnings, as they remove noise associated with nonrecurring items (e.g., Bhattacharya, Black, 
Christensen, & Larson, 2003; 2012). Alternatively, management may be ‘turning up the noise’ to 
opportunistically manage investor perception of performance (e.g., Black & Christensen, 2009; 
Brown, Christensen, & Elliott, 2012; Doyle, Lundholm, & Soliman, 2003). New Zealand’s 
Financial Market Authority (FMA, 2012) also notes that “non-GAAP financial information has 
the potential to be misleading”. As such, this thesis aims to contribute to the literature, and 
provide insight to regulators, on what motivates the disclosure of these earnings measures in 
New Zealand.  
This study contributes to the existing literature in a number of main ways. First, I consider the 
characteristics of NGEs disclosures (such as reconciliation quality and emphasis) when 
determining whether these disclosures are driven by informativeness or opportunism. Following 
Zhang and Zheng (2011), I use an ordinal reconciliation-score methodology to account for the 
transparency of adjustments between statutory profit and NGEs; I also consider the emphasis 
placed on NGEs disclosures by examining strategic placement, such as disclosure before 
statutory profit.
2
   
Second, this will be the most comprehensive study about the determinants of NGEs in New 
Zealand. More specifically, my initial sample includes all firms on the NZX Main Board 
                                                          
1
Bradshaw and Sloan (2002); Rainsbury, Hart, and Malthus (2012); and  Deloitte (2014) in New Zealand; KPMG 
(2011) in Australia.  
2
 Defined as net profit after tax. 





, and I consider preliminary earnings announcements (hereafter, prelims) in addition to 
annual reports as sources of non-GAAP information.   
Third, in the wake of media and firm commentaries, which suggest that the adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) has increased the use of NGEs, I also 
investigate the effects of the IFRS adoption.  
I also examine whether the FMA’s (2012) recent Guidance Note: Disclosing non-GAAP 
financial information has fulfilled its purpose of “[increasing] the likelihood that financial 
information is disclosure in a way that is not misleading” by examining whether NGEs 
disclosures are less likely to be motivated by opportunistically-linked firm characteristics post-
FMA (2012) guidance. From this perspective this study has the potential to inform regulators 
about policy decisions relating to NGEs. 
I differentiate between NGEs to acknowledge that, in contrast to adjusted earnings, well-defined 
NGEs that frequently appear on the face of the income statement (EB metrics, such as earnings 
before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortisation) have less potential to be used 
opportunistically (Hitz, 2010). I then provide an integrated analysis of these measures by 
controlling for the disclosure of EB measures when analysing the determinants of adjusted 
earnings disclosures. This recognises that non-professional investors may treat adjusted earnings 
disclosures differently in the presence of EB disclosures (Reimsbach, 2014). 
Finally, I decompose audit fees, using an audit-fee model, to recognise that audit fees and NGEs 
disclosure might be jointly determined. I then consider whether non-GAAP opportunism is a 
‘fraud risk’ factor that is priced by auditors.      
                                                          
3
 The main board equity security market operated by NZX.  
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I find evidence that the disclosure of NGEs is associated with both informatively- and 
opportunistically-linked firm characteristics.
4
 This suggests that informative and opportunistic 
incentives are both important determinants of NGEs. In wake of this finding, I make the 
recommendation that equity analysts and other investors discount the weights they assign to 
NGEs to account for non-GAAP opportunism.  
IFRS is associated with an increased probability of NGEs disclosure; and an increased 
probability that disclosers will provide high-quality reconciliations to statutory profit, whereas 
opportunistically-linked firm characteristics are associated with a decreased probability of high-
quality reconciliations. This evidence is consistent with arguments that inherently-noisy IFRS 
earnings motivate informative non-GAAP disclosure. I consider this an important contribution to 
both non-GAAP literature and the debate on the quality of IFRS information.    
I fail to find that opportunistically-linked firm characteristics are less likely to shape non-GAAP 
disclosure post-FMA (2012) guidance. It could, however, be argued that because the FMA’s 
(2012) guidance is positively associated with reconciliation quality, a latent reduction of non-
GAAP opportunism might have occurred.   
There is mixed evidence on whether informative disclosers are more or less likely to provide 
high-quality reconciliations. Evidence suggests that both informativeness and opportunism can 
lead to non-GAAP emphasis, which might explain why some informatively-linked disclosers are 
less likely to provide high-quality reconciliations.
5
 These results suggest there is a juxtaposition 
                                                          
4
 These links are established in section 4.3, where I consider associations between firm characteristics and 
disclosures found to be informative and opportunistic in the relevant literature.  
5
 It could be argued that failing to reconcile NGEs to statutory profit gives NGEs added emphasis relative to 
statutory profit.  
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where ‘calling noise control’
6
 is likely to effectively reduce non-GAAP opportunism, while also 
increasing some investors’ exposure to the noise inherent in IFRS earnings by limiting the 
practices of informative disclosers.  
There is limited evidence that the decision to disclose well-defined, commonly-used metrics such 
as EBITDA (EB metrics) is opportunistically motivated. On the other hand, evidence suggests 
these measures are opportunistically emphasised. I also contribute to the literature by 
demonstrating that the failure to differentiate, and recognise interactions, between EB metrics 
and other types of NGEs can led to false inferences about the determinants of less common 
NGEs.  
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I summarise the background 
and institutional setting that surround the non-GAAP reporting paradigm. In Chapter 3, I review 
the relevant literature, which is then used to motivate my hypotheses. Chapter 4 introduces the 
data collection process and establishes a methodology for analysing these data. Chapter 5 
examines the characteristics of my samples.  In Chapters 6 and 7, I present univariate and 
multivariate results, respectively. Chapter 8 provides robustness checks and then summarises my 
findings. In Chapter 9, I conclude by discussing the practical implications of this research. 
                                                          
6
Regulatory restrictions aimed at preventing opportunistic disclosers from ‘turning up the noise’ by restraining non-
GAAP disclosure or emphasis, or requiring the high-quality reconciliations. 
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Chapter 2 – Background and Institutional Setting 
 
2.1 What are non-GAAP earnings? 
 
While firms report a myriad of modifications to statutory profit, the majority of the relevant 
literature collectively refers to these adjusted measures as pro forma (e.g., Christensen, Drake, & 
Thornock, 2014; Johnson & Schwartz, 2005; Lougee & Marquardt, 2004), non-GAAP
7
 (e.g., 
Doyle, Jennings, & Soliman, 2013; Frankel, McVay, & Soliman, 2011; Isidro & Marques, 2014), 
or street earnings (Barth, Gow, & Taylor, 2012; Bradshaw & Sloan, 2002). For the purpose of 
this study, the term non-GAAP earnings (NGEs) has been adopted. However, the terms above 
tend to refer to analogous concepts. 
The FMA’s (2012) guidance note titled Disclosing Non-GAAP Financial Information describes 
such information as “calculated on a basis other than GAAP or calculated in accordance with 
GAAP and then adjusted”. This is consistent with U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) Regulation G characterisation of NGEs as ‘non-GAAP’ or ‘adjusted-GAAP’ measures. A 
common misconception is that non-GAAP measures do not include EBIT (earnings before 
interest and tax) and EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortisation). 
Indeed, the SEC has recognised that EBIT and EBITDA should be reconciled to the closest 
GAAP measure (Isidro & Marques, 2009). Conversely, some authors argue that as EBIT and 
EBITDA are commonly reported as a standard step on the income statement, they should be 
excluded from non-GAAP analyses (e.g., Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen, & Mergenthaler, 
2007). The FMA (2012) advocates that “additional line items or subtotals included in an entity’s 
income statement can comply with GAAP, if the same line items or sub-totals are included in 
                                                          
7
 More recently the term non-IFRS has also been adopted (e.g., Gaynor, 2014a).  
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documents other than financial statements and are presented as an alternative to the GAAP 
profit, then [when determining FMA guidance note applicability] they are considered to be non-
GAAP profit information”. Hitz (2010) adopts a method that distinguishes EBIT and EBITDA 
from adjusted earnings
8
 metrics, offering the explanations that “EB metrics are regularly 
reported on the face of the income statement, or can be teased out from the income statement 
data and supplementary notes”, and are well-defined, commonly-used variants. It follows that 
these measures differ from other (adjusted) NGEs, in that the nondiscretionary nature of 
adjustments implies they have relatively limited potential to be used opportunistically. This 
distinction is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: The decomposition of NGEs 
 
* Following Hitz (2010), a broad perspective on non-GAAP reporting is adopted which includes EBT , EBIT, and 
EBITDA as EB metrics.As a robustness check, EBT (earnings before tax) is removed from the list of EB metrics. 
                                                          
8
 Hitz (2010) refers to these as “pure” non-GAAP earnings.  
Non-GAAP earnings
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Recognising these inherent differences between EB metrics and adjusted earnings, I use separate 
multivariate logistic regressions to identify their determinants. I also contribute to the literature 
by demonstrating that aggregating NGEs (to include EB metrics) can lead to false inferences 
about the determinants of adjusted earnings (sometimes referred to as ‘pure’ non-GAAP 
earnings).  
Using a sample of 102 graduate accounting and finance students at a large German university as 
a proxy for non-professional investors, Reimsbach (2014) provides experimental evidence that 
the disclosure of EB metrics can mitigate the discount assigned to adjusted earnings by non-
professional investors. Accordingly, an EB control might be an omitted variable in the non-
GAAP literature. To the best of my knowledge, this will be the first study to control for EB 
metrics disclosure when analysing the determinants of adjusted earnings metrics.  
2.2 What are the most common adjustments? 
 
Using a sample of hand-collected NGEs figures from press releases, Bhattacharya et al. (2003) 
find that that depreciation and amortisation and stock compensation costs are the most 
frequently-used non-GAAP adjustments.
9
 Doyle et al. (2003) categorise exclusions from NGEs 
as either special items or other exclusions. Special items are defined as “unusual or nonrecurring 
items presented above taxes”, whereas other exclusions are the difference between NGEs and 
GAAP earnings after accounting for special items. The most common special items are found to 
be restructuring charges, asset write-downs, and losses on the sale of assets. Similarly, Bowen, 
Davis, and Matsumoto (2005) acknowledge the frequent use of goodwill amortisation, stock-
                                                          
9
 Black and Christensen (2009) also reach this conclusion.  
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based compensation-related charges, restructuring charges, and gains/losses on the sale of assets 
as non-GAAP adjustments. Deloitte (2014) provide a summary of commonly-used adjustments 
in the annual reports of 100 New Zealand companies between 2011 and 2013. Consistent with 
the US literature, Deloitte (2014) find that depreciation and amortisation,
10
 gains and losses on 
the sale of assets, asset write-downs, and, to a lesser extent, restructuring charges are also 
common adjustments in New Zealand’s non-GAAP reporting landscape.
11
 In addition, fair value 
adjustments are also a common exclusion. On the other hand, Deloitte (2014) do not include 
stock-based compensation as an adjustment category, which might suggest that these adjustments 
are less common in a New Zealand setting.   
2.3 Where are non-GAAP earnings disclosed? 
 
The FMA (2012) recognises that multiple channels are used to disclose non-GAAP information. 
For example, typically NGEs are disclosed in annual reports, market announcements, press 
releases, interviews, presentations to investors, and analyst briefings. This thesis collects data 
from annual reports and prelims. Prelims are required to be periodically reported within 60 days 
from the balance date according to the NZSX listing rule 10.4. This provides investors the first 
official disclosure of interim and final financial results. I focus on the preliminary announcement 
of annual results. To the best of my knowledge, the determinants of NGEs from prelims is yet to 
be examined in New Zealand.  The annual report is required under section 207D(1) of the 
Companies Act 1993 and related regulations. The annual report provides a more comprehensive 
analysis of the use of this information.  
                                                          
10
 Deloitte’s (2014) analysis considers EBITDA to be a readily understood and consistently applied non-GAAP 
measure (page 1). 
11
 In figure 3 of Deloitte’s (2014) Underlying profit 2013 Depreciation/amortisation, Acquisitions/disposals, and 
Impairment of assets are all commonly used adjustments.  
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While most NGEs disclosures in annual reports and prelims appear in management discussions, 
tables of financial highlights, and graphical depictions, more subtle disclosures may also occur. 
Since sum-of-the-parts valuation
12
 is a popular technique employed by analysts valuing 
companies with multiple business segments, the segmental reporting note might also be an 
important source of NGEs—especially since the introduction of IFRS 8.
13
 For example, in a 
letter to Andrew Mason, the chief executive officer of Groupon Inc., the SEC (2011) made the 
following statement in relation to information provided in an IPO filing: 
We note that the use of the non-GAAP measure Adjusted Consolidated Segment Operating 
Income, which excludes, among other items, online market expense. It appears that online 
market expense is a normal recurring cash expenditure of the company. Your removal of this 
item from your results of operations creates a non-GAAP measure that is potentially misleading 
to readers.  
In particular, this raises concern about the potential for opportunistic exclusions by not 
attributing recurring expenses to any particular business segment, then aggregating segments to 
modify GAAP earnings. Examples of NGEs disclosure through the aggregation of individual 
segments can also be found in a New Zealand setting. In their 2007 annual report, Opus 
International Consulting Limited (OIC) disclose a figure entitled “Segment Result”. This cannot 
be found elsewhere in their annual report despite the presentation of the subtotals for EBITDA, 
EBIT, and Operating Surplus before tax, before disclosing statutory profit in their Income 
Statement.    
                                                          
12
 Sum-of-the-parts value is also commonly referred to as breakup value or private market value, and involves 
valuing each component business as an independent going concern (CFA Institute, 2012, p. 31). 
13
 Section 2.4 discusses IFRS 8 Operating Segments in further detail.  
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One cause for concern over the use of NGEs in the segmental reporting note could be that being 
a supplementary note to the financial statements might lend these disclosures unwarranted 
credibility. Perhaps an even stronger argument could be raised against the disclosure of NGEs in 
the income statement. For example, The Colonial Motor Company Limited (CMO) present 




2.4 The adoption of IFRS 
 
NZ equivalents to IFRS (NZ-IFRS) were permitted to be adopted on or after 1 January 2005, 
with mandatory adoption from 1 January 2007.  
Brian Gaynor (2010) of Milford Asset Management suggests NGEs result from the rejection of 
IFRS-compliant profits as realistic interpretations of performance. In their 2014 Annual Report, 
Skyline Enterprises Limited go so far as to state “the introduction of IFRS accounting policies in 
2009 along with the inability of those responsible for overseeing these policies to ensure 
appropriate and relevant application within New Zealand has resulted in Income Statements that 
are inconsistent and confusing to most readers”.  
In particular, much of the concern over IFRS has tended to relate to the treatment of fair value 
adjustments. As mentioned, Deloitte’s (2014) Underlying profit 2013 demonstrates that fair 
value adjustments are common in a New Zealand setting. Chatham Rock Phosphate Limited’s 
(CRP) 2011 annual report describes a significant distortion of their financial statements arising 
from holding 10% of a project at acquisition cost, while the other 90% was based on capitalised 
exploration and project costs. They suggest this arises from their inability to revalue mineral 
                                                          
14
 Trading Profit After Tax excludes the line items Earthquake Insurance Recovery, Loss on Demolition of Property, 
Impairment loss on Goodwill, Deferred Tax on Property Depreciation, and Fair Value Revaluation of Property. 
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properties under IFRS. Delegat Group Limited (DGL) has also raised concerns about IFRS. In 
their 2010 annual report, Chairman Robert Wilton identifies fair value adjustments as the 
primary reason NZ IFRS fail to adequately capture underlying operational performance. In their 
2008 prelim, Livestock Improvement Corporation Limited (LIC) also corroborate that 
revaluations required under IFRS inhibit statutory profit from providing a more meaningful 
measure of performance.
15
 Consistent with these concerns, a textual search reveals that in 2013 
eight of the companies in our sample
16
 report NGEs with “EBITDAF” (earnings before interest, 
taxation, depreciation and amortisation, and fair value adjustments) contained within their title. 
In contrast, in the first year of our sample—the sample begins in 2004, prior to IFRS reporting—
no NGEs titles contained “EBITDAF”.
17
  
IFRS 8 Operating Segments replaced IAS 14 Segmental Reporting on 30 November 2006, with 
mandatory adoption for periods beginning on or after 1 January 2009. A major change from IAS 
14 is the IFRS 8 does not define the measurement of segment profit or loss. According to 
Deloitte (2006), this gives entities “more discretion in determining what is included in segment 
profit of loss under IFRS 8, limited only by their internal reporting practices” (p. 1). An 
argument could be made that IFRS 8 has led to more NGEs disclosure.   
                                                          
15
 Other examples of such statements include the annual report of Metlifecare in 2009, which states the introduction 
of volatility in their income statement results from the introduction of IFRS treatment of investment property 
valuation.      
16
 In 2013, our sample includes 113 firms listed on the NZX. 
17
 While a detailed discussion of fair value accounting is outside the scope of this study (see Laux & Leuz, 2009, for 
more information on this topic), it is worth mentioning an upcoming change that might alter the non-GAAP 
reporting paradigm—I would like to thank the FMA for bringing this upcoming change to my attention. It is 
possible that some non-GAAP reporting results from IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement 
(Stent, Bradbury, & Hooks, 2010). While this rules-based standard allows for the components of financial items to 
be hedged, hedge accounting is not allowed for components of non-financial items. One could argue that this is not 
well-aligned with modern risk-management practices. IFRS 9 Financial Instruments (effective for annual periods 
beginning on or after 1 January 2018) will replace IAS 39. This new standard’s principles-based approach will 
remove the distinction between financial and non-financial assets. 
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2.5 The FMA (2012) guidance note 
 
Recognising the increasing use of non-GAAP information in public documents and its potential 
to be misleading, the FMA (2012) defines non-GAAP information and provides their views on 
its presentation, with three key objectives in mind: namely, to promote the meaningful 
communication of financial information, to increase the probability that financial information is 
not conveyed in a misleading manner, and to provide certainty about the FMA’s views on 
disclosure as well as insight on how disclosures will be assessed. While adherence to the 
guidance note does not represent a legal obligation, the FMA (2012) advise that following their 




To reduce the risk of misleading non-GAAP information the FMA (2012) provides 10 pieces of 




1) Why the information is useful (stating why it is believed that NGEs are useful) 
2) Prominence (not to give NGEs undue prominence, emphasis, or authority) 
3) Appropriate label (a clear label, so NGEs can be distinguished from GAAP earnings) 
4) Calculation (a clear narrative explanation of how NGEs are calculated) 
5) Reconciliation (a reconciliation of NGEs itemising and explaining adjustments) 
6) Consistency (a consistent approach to calculating NGEs from period to period) 
7) Adjustments (adjusting corresponding items in any comparative information) 
                                                          
18
 Legislative provision relating to misleading information that is explicitly noted by the FMA (2012) guidance note 
includes sections 11 and 13 of the Securities Market Act 1988, and section 377 of the Companies Act.  
19
A technical point is that while this study only considers non-GAAP profit information, the FMA (2012) guidance 
note more broadly refers to the presentation of non-GAAP financial information as a whole. 
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8) Unbiased (not using NGEs to avoid presenting ‘bad news’ or over-emphasise ‘good 
news’) 
9) One-off items (NGEs adjustments should not be described as ‘one-off’ or ‘non-recurring’) 
10) Audited or reviewed (clearly stating when NGEs adjustments are audited or reviewed) 
 




Chapter 3 – Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
  
Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) document the rise of (non-GAAP) street earnings, citing them as the 
primary determinant of stock prices, and noting the marked increase in the instances where these 
measures differ materially from GAAP earnings. While proponents of non-GAAP reporting 
advocate that these measures reduce noise by removing transitory items, concerns have been 
raised that companies might be reporting ‘everything but bad stuff’ (Bhattacharya et al., 2003).  
3.1 Informative versus opportunistic motivations 
 
The prior literature has documented two broad explanations on why firms may report NGEs. 
First, the informative argument contends that NGEs provide a more useful measure of economic 
performance by removing nonrecurring accounting adjustments (‘turning down the noise’). 
Bhattacharya et al. (2003) find that non-GAAP numbers are more persistent and informative 
compared with their GAAP counterparts.
20
 However, one potential caveat is that the use of non-
GAAP reporting in their sample is concentrated in high-tech firms that frequently report GAAP 
losses. This might compromise the external validity of their results, given that NGEs are now 
widely more used by many companies.
21
 On the other hand, it has been argued that as high-tech 
and loss-prone firms have less value-relevant GAAP earnings, this behaviour is consistent with 
managers emphasising the measure most indicative of actual performance.
22
 Brown and 
Sivakumar (2003) find that operating earnings reported by managers and analysts contain 
                                                          
20
 Based on an analysis of short-window abnormal returns.  
21
 The FMA (2012) speaks to the increasing use of non-GAAP financial information in New Zealand, while KPMG 
(2011) refers to presenting some form of non-statutory profit being the “market norm” in the Australian market. I 
have found that more than three quarters of annual reports and preliminary earnings announcements include at least 
one non-GAAP earnings measure.  
22
Bowen et al. (2005) reach this conclusion looking at the emphasis on GAAP versus non-GAAP earnings in press 
releases. Similarly, Lougee and Marquardt (2004) examine press releases and find low GAAP earnings 
“informativeness” is associated with the production of non-GAAP earnings.  




incremental value-relevant information compared with GAAP-based operating earnings. Johnson 
and Schwartz (2005) also corroborate an informative argument; using an analysis of market 
multiples,
23
 they fail to find evidence that NGEs are associated with overpricing.   
Alternatively, managers may disclose and emphasise NGEs for opportunistic reasons (‘turn up 
the noise’). One strand of the literature contests recurring expenses are opportunistically 
excluded to manage investor perceptions of performance (Barth et al., 2012; Black & 
Christensen, 2009; Brown et al., 2012; Doyle et al., 2003). Andersson and Hellman (2007) find 
that in the presence of non-GAAP reporting, cognitive errors
24
 lead analysts to present higher 
forecasts. This suggests even sophisticated users of financial information may buy into 
opportunistic exclusions. On the other hand, while Doyle et al. (2013) find that NGEs are 
strategically used as a means of meeting and beating analyst forecasts, investors appear to 
discount resultant earnings surprises, which is consistent with the market partially recognising 
the opportunistic nature of exclusions.  
Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen, and Mergenthaler (2004) argue that less sophisticated 
investors are more likely to trade on NGEs information. Christensen et al. (2014) suggest the 
presence of short sellers when NGEs are announced reveals that these figures create asymmetries 
which informed investors exploit at the expense of less sophisticated investors. Therefore, less 
sophisticated investors might be more prone to misinterpreting NGEs.  
Caramanis and Lennox (2008) test the influence of auditor effort on earnings management. They 
find that when auditor (effort) hours are low, managers aggressively engage in accrual-based 
earnings management. Chen, Krishnan, and Pevzner (2012) entertain the idea that, while they are 
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 Including enterprise-value-to-sales (EVS), price-to-book (PB), and price-to-earnings (PE) ratios.  
24
 It is suggested that non-GAAP reporting leads to framing and anchoring belief-perseverance biases.  




typically not directly responsible for non-GAAP information, the fiduciary responsibility that 
auditors have to the public obligates them to ensure that all documents that they put their names 
to are fair and unbiased. Black, Black, and Christensen (2014) show that higher-than-normal 
audit fees exhibit a negative relationship with potentially-misleading exclusions of recurring 
items in NGEs metrics. This suggests that auditor effort might prevent opportunistic NGEs 
disclosures. Conversely, in a pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (pre-SOX) environment, Chen et al. (2012) 
find a positive association between audit fees and the “other exclusions” component of non-
GAAP adjustments, which they cite as potentially opportunistic. This suggests that audit fees 
might capture both auditor effort, but also compensation for ‘fraud risk’ associated with non-
GAAP opportunism.  
One interpretation of the conflicting international evidence on NGEs disclosures could be that at 
times these measures are disclosed because of their “informativeness”, whereas in other 
instances they are used opportunistically. 
In their unpublished working paper, Rainsbury et al. (2012) investigate explanations for (NGEs) 
non-GAAP earnings disclosures in New Zealand, finding that almost two-thirds (51 out of 79) of 
these reported figures are higher than statutory profit.
25
 They argue that these disclosures are 
likely motivated by management’s desire to manipulate perceptions of performance. Rainsbury, 
Hart, and Buranavityawut (2015) provide additional support that the incidence of NGEs 
exceeding statutory profit is greater than chance using a sample that includes all companies listed 
on the NZX in 2012.
26
 These authors also compare statutory profit and NGEs as predictors of 
future profit and value (share price). They find evidence to suggest that NGEs provide 
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 Non-GAAP earnings are only found to have means and medians significantly greater than NPAT in 2009 and 
2010 (two out of eight years). 
26
 Their sample covers the year 2004 to 2012.  




incremental information to the market. Rather than analysing opportunism and informativeness 
by comparing non-GAAP and statutory profit figures, this paper seeks to understand what 
motivates NGEs disclosure (opportunism or informativeness) by examining the firm 
characteristics of disclosers.
27
 Consistent with conflicting international evidence on whether 
disclosure is motivated by informativeness or opportunism and the findings of Rainsbury, Hart, 
and Buranavityawut (2015), my first hypothesis is  
H 1: Both informative and opportunistic motivations are associated with an increased likelihood 
of NGEs disclosure. 
3.2 The importance of examining characteristics of non-GAAP earnings 
disclosures 
 
Zhang and Zheng (2011) attribute mispricing caused by NGEs to low reconciliation quality. 
They find that after the SEC introduced a regulation requiring companies to quantitatively 
reconcile NGEs with GAAP earnings that mispricing was alleviated. It follows that firms 
disclosing NGEs with high- (low-) quality reconciliations might be more likely to be informative 
(opportunistic) disclosers.  
In section 3.1, it was argued that non-professional investors might be most susceptible to non-
GAAP opportunism (for example, Christensen et al., 2014). Elliott (2006) advocates that 
emphasis on, as opposed to the mere presence of, NGEs plays an important role in determining 
                                                          
27 This methodology facilitates the inclusion of operating-level NGEs, which might consistently exceed statutory 
profit. For example, normalised EBITDA metrics are likely to consistently exceed statutory profit—on the basis that 
EBITDA will most likely be greater than statutory profit. The choice of an EBITDA-level metric could be an 
informative decision made to facilitate comparison with companies that have different levels of infrastructure 
maturity (CFA Institute, 2011, p. 348).   




how non-professional investors react to these disclosures. Allee, Bhattacharya, Black, and 
Christensen (2007)  find that the dependence of these less-sophisticated investors on NGEs is 
exacerbated when NGEs disclosures occur before GAAP earnings in the press release. One 
interpretation of these findings could be that the decisions of non-professional investors are 
susceptible to unintentional cognitive effects. To this point, in instances where non-GAAP 
disclosures are opportunistically motivated, considerable emphasis might be placed on these 
figures.  
With the above literature in mind, Hypotheses 2 and 3 have been developed: 
H 2: There is a positive (negative) association between reconciliation quality and informative 
(opportunistic) NGEs disclosure motivations. 
H 3: There is a positive (negative) association between NGEs emphasis and opportunistic 
(informative) disclosure motivations.  
3.3 Regulatory changes and non-GAAP earnings  
 
Drawing on the international literature, on the surface, it is not clear why IFRS would motivate 
the increased disclosure of NGEs. Many authors find that IFRS leads to more value-relevant 
accounting information (Aharony, Barniv, & Falk, 2010; Barth, Landsman, & Lang, 2008; Chua, 
Cheong, & Gould, 2012; Horton & Serafeim, 2010).
28
 Which, intuitively, should reduce the need 
for using non-GAAP disclosures informatively. Notably, Aharony et al. (2010) compare the 
                                                          
28
 On the other hand, in an Australian setting, Goodwin, Ahmed, and Heaney (2008) fail to find evidence that IFRS 
earnings are more value relevant than Australian Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (AGAAP). However, 
using a longer time period, Chua et al. (2012) contest this finding, asserting that the benefit of IFRS might have 
taken time to materialise, given that Australian firms were poorly prepared for the transition to IFRS (Goodwin, 
Cooper, & Johl, 2008; Jones & Higgins, 2006). 




value relevance of asset revaluations
29
 under IFRS with prior European domestic accounting 
practices. They find that IFRS is associated with an increase in value relevance. While this result 
might seem particularly admissible to this study, given that New Zealand firms and media 
consider fair value treatment a major motivation for non-GAAP disclosure (as discussed in 
section 2.4), Kabir, Laswad, and Islam (2010) outline some essential differences between pre-
IFRS NZ GAAP and pre-IFRS GAAP in continental Europe
30
 which could cause results to 
differ. These authors find that the discretionary accruals reported by a sample of New Zealand 
firms are significantly higher under IFRS, suggesting lower-quality earnings. Furthermore, they 
find no significant difference in the ability of earnings to predict one-year-ahead cash flows from 
operations (CFO). Conversely, Houqe, Monem, and Van Zijl (2013) find a negative relationship 
between IFRS and cost of equity capital. They suggest this could be attributed to IFRS being a 
higher-quality set of accounting standards, although one could argue that this could also be the 
result of the mandatory adoption of IFRS resulting in less investor home bias in other countries, 
such as the United States (Khurana & Michas, 2011).  
One interpretation of this conflicting evidence could be that IFRS has resulted in the production 
of a large amount of additional information, including the inclusion of both value-relevant and 
value-irrelevant accounting amounts. For example, Morunga and Bradbury (2013) cite evidence 
of a considerable increase in the lengths of New Zealand firms’ annual reports following the 
introduction of IFRS. When discussing the impact of NZ IFRS, Kabir et al. (2010) acknowledge 
that IFRS requires that recognition of many items (for example, biological assets, financial 
instruments, and derivatives) that were formerly ‘off-balance-sheet’. Crawford, Lont, and Scott 
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 These authors also consider goodwill and research and development expenses (R&D). 
30
 Including the use of Anglo-Saxon Accounting (ASA) in New Zealand, compared with the creditor-oriented 
continental European system.  




(2013) find that IFRS is associated with an increase in the voluntary expense disclosure by New 
Zealand firms. To this point, while some of the additional reporting requirements associated with 
IFRS might be value relevant, it seems likely that the increased scope of IFRS is also associated 
with the inclusion of some nonrecurring accounting information. To the extent that IFRS has 
resulted in the inclusion of nonrecurring accounting adjustments, it might be motivating 
informative non-GAAP disclosures. Consistent with this argument, Rainsbury et al. (2012) 
provide New Zealand evidence that the increased disclosure of NGEs is likely to be, at least in 
part, due to the adoption of IFRS.
31
 Given that hypothesis 2 assumes that informativeness will be 
positively associated with non-GAAP reconciliation quality, my fourth hypothesis is 
H 4: There is a positive association between both NGEs disclosure and NGEs reconciliation 
quality and the IFRS reporting regime. 
Internationally, considerable concern has been raised over non-GAAP reporting practices.
32
 
Some evidence suggests that regulation can enhance the quality of non-GAAP information. In a 
South African setting, where there is a mandatory requirement to disclose NGEs and provide an 
audited reconciliation, Venter, Emanuel, and Cahan (2014) find that headline earnings are value 
relevant, while exclusions are value irrelevant. That is, these measures appear to be informative. 
In the United States, Black, Black, Christensen, and Heninger (2012) cite signs of improvement 
in investors’ perceptions of non-GAAP reporting quality following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002. Also in the United States, Bowen et al. (2005) find that after the introduction of SEC 
Regulation G, imposing the requirement for GAAP information to be presented with the same 
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In a logistic regression, these authors find a positive relationship between the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings 
and the IFRS reporting regime.  
32
 For example, the Committee of European Securities Regulators’ (CESR, 2005) in Europe; Standard and Poor’s 
Rating Services (S&P, 2014) in the UK; and the SEC (2011) in the US. S&P (2014) report that of all nonfinancial 
companies in the FTSE 100 Index adjusted operating profit exceed IFRS profit in73% of cases.  




prominence as non-GAAP information, a significant trend from non-GAAP emphasis to GAAP 
emphasis in press releases was observed. Furthermore, given Zhang and Zheng’s (2011) findings 
(that quantitative reconciliation requirements alleviated non-GAAP mispricing), it would appear 
that other countries have managed to effectively implement regulation that has enhanced the 
quality of non-GAAP information. 
A second regulatory effect was the release of the FMA (2012) guidance note. The guidance note 
conveys their views on the manner in which non-GAAP financial information should be 
presented. Subsequent to the FMA (2012) guidance note, the FMA (2013), Deloitte (2014), and 
Rainsbury and Hart (2014) have all provided summary statistics on the influence of the guidance 
note on reporting practices. While these authors find signs of a slight improvement in disclosers 
behaviour, reporting practices surrounding non-GAAP disclosures still fall short of FMA’s 
(2012) guidance. This sheds doubt on whether this guidance note has been effective at mitigating 
misleading performance disclosures. Hitz (2010) found that the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators’ (CESR, 2005) Recommendations on Alternative Performance Measures
33
 
did not yield any measurable improvement in earnings disclosure quality.
34
 This raises concerns 
about the ability of the FMA guidance note to protect the relevant stakeholders against 
misleading non-GAAP disclosures, and leads me to my final hypothesis:  
H 5: The FMA (2012) guidance has not significantly altered the NGEs reporting landscape
35
. 
                                                          
33
 These recommendations are similar in many aspects to the FMA guidelines. Common features include calling for 
explanations of why alternative performance measures are presented; disclosure of whether these measures have 
been subject to an auditor’s review; consistent application of alternative performance measures; not to provide 
undue prominence to these measures; and reconciliation of figures.  
34
 In terms of frequency or focus of non-GAAP reporting, nor the associated reconciliatory information.  
35
 Landscape is used to collectively refer to all of the salient NGEs characteristics examined in this paper. These 
include disclosure, reconciliations quality and emphasis (measured using Focus and Before –variable definitions 
provided in Table 22, Appendices). 




To the best of my knowledge, the effects the FMA (2012) guidance on non-GAAP disclosure, 
reconciliation quality, and emphasis has not been examined in a multivariate context.
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Chapter 4 – Data Collection and Methodology 
 
The initial sample consists of all firms on the NZSX between 2004 and 2013 with an available 
annual report and prelim. Property investment and property trust firms, banking and financial 
services firms, and tracker fund firms are excluded due to underlying differences.
36
 
4.1 Data collection methodology  
 
NGEs information is hand-collected from annual reports and prelim filings which are retrieved 
from the NZX Company Research database. Outside of the income statement, all measures of 
disclosed performance have been collected,
37
 including statutory profit—the only measure 
considered non–non-GAAP. Collecting statutory profit where it is disclosed facilitates a more 
comprehensive analysis of whether managers are placing undue prominence, emphasis, or 
authority on non-GAAP metrics. It is worth noting that the collection of NGEs includes the 
segmental reporting notes to the financial statements, where the bottom-line earnings measure is 
an item other than statutory profit.  
Non-statutory profit income statement line items that are presented at an after-tax level have also 
been collected. For example, take the following extract (Figure 2) from the income statement 
present in The Colonial Motor Company Limited’s (CMO) 2012 annual report, as discussed in 
section 2.3. 
                                                          
36
 Two reasons necessitate the exclusion of these types of firms. Firstly, adjustments that are generally associated 
with removing nonrecurring items (e.g., fair value or exchange gain/loss adjustments) are more likely to be part of 
these firms’ normal business activities. Secondly, given the complexity of accounting for Financial Instruments (IAS 
39), both statutory profit and non-GAAP earnings can be highly technical for these firms. 11 property investment 
and property trust firms, 25 firms in the business of banking, management assets, or financial services, and 6 tracker 
funds have been excluded.  
37
 As discussed in section 2.1, the FMA (2012) advocates that “additional line items or subtotals included in an 
entity’s income statement can comply with GAAP, if the same line items or sub-totals are included in documents 
other than financial statements and are presented as an alternative to the GAAP profit, then [when determining FMA 
guidance note applicability] they are considered to be non-GAAP profit information”.  
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Figure 2: Extract from the Colonial Motor Company Limited's 2012 Annual Report 
 
Here it is argued that presenting an item after tax the income tax expense could attract special 
attention given that this deviates from the traditional way in which revenue and expenses are 
delineated to reach statutory profit. As such, for the purpose of this study these items are 
considered alternatives to statutory profit and classified as NGEs. 
The collection of data has demonstrated that the labels assigned to NGEs can at times be 
misleading. For example, in their 2006 annual report, NPT Limited presents “Net Surplus before 
Taxation” and “Net Surplus after Taxation” in a table of financial highlights. Viewing this table 
in isolation, it is not apparent that these figures exclude an unrealised decrease in investment 
property values. Subsequent to the FMA (2012) guidance, the FMA (2013) have raised concern 
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about several instances where the “EBITDA” title was used but additional adjustments
38
 have 
been made. Therefore, NGEs measures are defined as earnings before (EB) or adjusted earnings 
(as depicted in Figure 1, p.6) based on the nature of their adjustments rather than their titles. 
Where firms make adjustments other than tax, interest/finance charges, and 
depreciation/amortisation, NGEs measures are defined as ‘adjusted’. In addition, adjusted 
earnings also include some instances where adjustments are made for part of these three items. 
For example, in their 2011 annual report, Briscoe Group Limited (BGR) present NPAT 
excluding a one-off deferred tax liability adjustment. As excluding only part of tax gives 
managers increased discretion to strategically manage earnings, this is considered an adjusted 
earnings measure. Put differently, adjusted earnings are NGEs after removing EBT, EBIT, and 
EBITDA (i.e., EB metrics).  
Data on the explanatory variables are sourced from a composite DataStream, S&P Capital IQ, 
and Bloomberg database (hereafter, referred to as the DCB database), or where needed and 
possible, manually collected from the annual reports.  
4.2 Data collection limitations  
 
Despite the considerable effort that has gone into checking and rechecking this dataset, it is 
possible that given the large amount of hand-collected data some errors have been made. All 
errors and omissions are my own.  
Furthermore, this analysis only considers the most recent annual results in the annual report or 
prelim. For example, while the 2006 prelim for the New Zealand Refining Company Limited 
(NZR) discloses no adjusted earnings for the year ending 31 Dec 2006, a 2005 performance 
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 Additional adjustments documented in the FMA (2013) review include equity accounting, impairment of assets, 
revaluations, acquisitions/ disposals, other gains/losses, and one-off or abnormal costs.  
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figure is disclosed excluding amortisation included in revenue of $31.5 million. Therefore, it 
could be inferred that while on a statutory basis profit had fallen from $161.7 to $135.5 million, 
on a non-GAAP basis their profit had increased slightly ($130.2 to $135.5). However, in such an 
instance, I do not recognise a NGEs disclosure as having taken place in 2006. Gaynor (2014b) 
makes the following statement:  
[Figures reported in 2014] highlight the huge differences between adjusted, normalised, 
underlying and [GAAP]-based earnings. These figures can be extremely confusing for investors 
because they allow companies to emphasise the highest profit figure for the latest reporting 
period and the lowest one from the previous corresponding period. As a consequence, the year 
on year percentage increase can be made to look extremely impressive. 
In addition, I only recognise non-GAAP disclosures when figures are disclosed. For example, I 
do not recognise a NGEs disclosure as having taken place when the Chairman’s Report in Opus 
International Consultants Limited’s (OIC) 2007 annual report discusses that “adjusting 2006 and 
2007 results for the after-tax effect of pension plan gains, $1.352m and $0.128m respectively, net 
surplus after tax grew by 17%.”     
4.3 Models 1–3, the determinants of disclosure  
 
The following logistic models
39
  (Models 1–3) are used to identify the key determinants of non-
GAAP earnings, adjusted earnings, and EB measure earnings. Subscripts i and t (firm and time) 
omitted for convenience and 𝜓[. ] represents the logistic function: 
                                                          
39
 Implicit in these regression models, and the models that follow, are two key assumptions. Firstly, after examining 
non-GAAP disclosure year by year non-GAAP disclosure, time-specific effects, beyond those already captured by 
the IFRS and FMA dummy variables have not been included. It is important to note that while June fiscal year-ends 
are the most frequent, less than half (approximately 45%) of firm-years in the sample have a June balance date, 
suggesting that time-specific events might relate to different fiscal years for different firms. While some authors 
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(1) 𝑃[𝑃𝑟𝑜𝐷𝑢𝑚 = 1] = 𝜓[𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑇𝑀 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽5Big4 +
𝛽6𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝 +  𝛽7𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 +  𝛽8𝐹𝑀𝐴 +  𝛽9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽10𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑣 +  𝛽11𝑇𝑜𝑝20 +
 𝛽12𝐿𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽13𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝜀] 
 
(2) 𝑃[𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑢𝑚 = 1] = 𝜓[𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑇𝑀 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔 +
𝛽5Big4 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝 +  𝛽7𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 +  𝛽8𝐹𝑀𝐴 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽10𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑣 +
 𝛽11𝑇𝑜𝑝20 + 𝛽12𝐿𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛽13𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 +  𝛽14𝐸𝐵𝐷𝑢𝑚 + 𝜀] 
 
(3) 𝑃[𝐸𝐵𝐷𝑢𝑚 = 1] = 𝜓[𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑇𝑀 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽5Big4 +
𝛽6𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝 +  𝛽7𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 +  𝛽8𝐹𝑀𝐴 +  𝛽9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽10𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑣 +  𝛽11𝑇𝑜𝑝20 +
 𝛽12𝐿𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽13𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝜀] 
 
The dependent variables in equations (1) – (3) are as follows: 
NGDum = a  binary variable equal to one when firm i discloses a measure of performance 
other statutory profit in year t, and zero otherwise; 
AdjustDum= a binary variable equal to one when firm i discloses non-GAAP earnings other 
than an EB measure in year t, and zero otherwise; 
EBDum= a binary variable equal to one when firm i discloses EBT, EBIT, or EBITDA in 
year t, and zero otherwise.  
As a point of reference, all variable definitions can be found in Table 22. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
control for fixed industry effects (e.g., Brown et al., 2012; Isidro & Marques, 2014)  using one-digit SIC codes, Kile 
and Phillips (2009) suggest using 11 different three-digit SIC codes to select the optimal combination of high-
technology firms—these three-digit SIC codes represent subsamples of five separate one-digit SIC industries. This 
precludes further industry controls; however, it seems reasonable to assume that explanatory variables such as Tech, 
Leverage, and Intang adequately control for industry-specific non-GAAP disclosure incentives. Robustness checks 
of these assumptions are made in Chapter 8.  
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4.3.1 Informative (I) explanatory variables 
 Technology firms are often characterised as poorly represented by statutory reporting 
requirements and thus might be more likely to informatively report an alternative measure of 
performance (Bowen et al., 2005; Lougee & Marquardt, 2004; Zhang & Zheng, 2011). Tech is a 
binary variable that takes the value one when firm i has a three-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code equal to 283, 357, 366, 367, 382, 384, 481, 482, 489, 737, or 873
40
 
(Kile & Phillips, 2009) in year  t, and zero otherwise.  
Hayn (1995) posits that because of the liquidation option afforded to shareholders, losses cannot 
be expected to perpetuate. Intuitively, it follows that given the expected transitory nature of 
losses, they hold less information than profits. Collins, Pincus, and Xie (1999) corroborate this 
argument, finding the association between price and earnings is stronger for profit than loss 
firms. Accordingly, losses are synonymous with low-value relevance of earnings (Bowen et al., 
2005; Zhang & Zheng, 2011), and therefore could lead to informative disclosure. PriorLoss is a 
binary variable equal to one if firm i reports statutory losses in both of the two years prior to year 
t, and zero otherwise.
41
  
BTM  is the book value of equity divided by market capitalisation for firm i at the end of fiscal 
year t. Lougee and Marquardt (2004) cite growth firms (low BTM) as difficult to value based on 
past accounting performance. Therefore, low BTM firms might disclose NGEs to provide a more 
informative performance measure. It follows that a negative coefficient is hypothesised for this 
                                                          
40
 See Kile and Phillips (2009) for the industry names related to each three-digit SIC code.  
41
 While avoiding losses might be a strategic target (Black & Christensen, 2009), by imposing the restriction that 
PriorLoss firms observe losses in both the two prior years, this might mitigate incentives for strategic earnings 
management associated with underperformance. Following Zhang and Zheng (2011), PriorLoss will be used as a 
proxy for low value relevance, whereas strategic disclosure incentives surrounding statutory losses will subsequently 
be considered with ReverseLoss (models 4–12).   
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variable. Even when viewed in isolation, limited liability implies that negative book values are 
not meaningful (Brown, Lajbcygier, & Li, 2008). Following Grosse, Kean, and Scott (2013), I 
winsorised BTM as a response. As in 45 out of 1188 (approx. 3.8%) of firm-years negative 




 percentiles.  
Lougee and Marquardt (2004) entertain the idea that investment in intangibles (for example, 
research and development) can distort GAAP earnings. Therefore, firms with greater intangible 
intensity may be more likely to disclose an alternative measure to statutory profit. To measure 
intangible intensity, Intang is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets for firm i in year t 
(Isidro & Marques, 2014; Lougee & Marquardt, 2004).   
Audit fees can reflect opportunism mitigating auditor effort (Black et al., 2014), but also 
opportunistically-linked non-GAAP ‘fraud risk’ compensation (Chen et al., 2012). As a 
consequence, here it is argued that, if included as an explanatory variable, AuditFees might be an 
endogenous variable. Put differently, audit fees and non-GAAP disclosure might be jointly 
determined because disclosures perceived as biased might lead to higher audit fees (Chen et al., 
2012); however, higher audit fees might reflect opportunism mitigating auditor effort (Black et 
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Figure 3: The joint determination of audit fees and NGEs disclosure 
 
One approach to dealing with endogenous variables could be to use a simultaneous equation 
model (SEM). However, it is argued that, rather than using SEMs, construct validity can be 
enhanced by decomposing AuditFees using an audit-fee model
42
 to separate auditor effort from 
‘fraud risk’ compensation.   
Figure 4: NGEs disclosure, auditor effort, and 'fraud risk' compensation  
 
Given that a traditional audit-fee model fails to capture ‘fraud risk’ compensation for non-GAAP 
reporting, the residuals from the audit-fee model should capture ‘fraud risk’ compensation after 
adequately controlling for auditor effort and other important determinants of audit fees (see 
                                                          
42
 Details of the audit-fee model are presented in section 4.6.  
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section 4.6). While predicted audit fees likely capture auditor effort, I elect to use a more direct 
proxy for auditor effort (Big4).  The literature generally agrees that bigger auditors supply 
higher-quality audits (e.g., Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998; Caramanis & 
Lennox, 2008). Big4 takes the value one when firm i is audited by Deloitte, Ernst & Young, 
KPMG, or PwC in year t, and zero otherwise.
43
  
4.3.2 Opportunistic(O) explanatory variables
44
 
While section 4.6 will outline the methodology for identifying likely opportunism based on 
whether auditors receive ‘fraud risk’ compensation, MktComp (Models 1–12) and ReverseLoss__ 
(Models 4–12, introduced in section 4.4) will also be used to evaluate whether opportunism is 
present.  
Isidro and Marques (2013) find that when board compensation is linked to a firm’s market 
performance, there is an increased likelihood of non-GAAP reporting practices linked with 
opportunism. To accommodate this consideration, the variable MktComp is also included as a 
left-hand-side variable. MktComp is the total dollar of value of restricted stock awards and option 
awards received by firm i’s executives in year t, divided by their total compensation. 
Compensation data include all executives profiled by S&P Capital IQ – ExecuComp. To ensure 
that MktComp adequately represents firm executives, firm-years are restricted to observations 
where at least three executives are profiled by ExecuComp. This results in the exclusion of 161 
observations, or 13.6% of the original sample (161 out of 1188). 
                                                          
43
 In the majority of firm-years (approximately 82%), audits appear to be concentrated towards BigN auditors. In the 
remaining one-fifth of firm-years, a variety of auditors are represented, including Audit NZ, BDO Spicers, Carlton-
DFK, Crowe Horwath, Hayne Knight Audit, PKF Martin Jarvie, Staples Rodway, WHK, and others. Consistent with 
Big4 being an appropriate proxy for auditor effort, I find that BigN firms are significantly more likely to have higher 
AuditFees (at a level of 1%, see Table 26, Appendices). 
44
 In addition, I examine opportunism from a ‘fraud risk’ perspective using the audit model presented in section 5.4.  
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4.3.3 Regulatory (R) explanatory variables 
IFRS is binary variables that takes the value one when a firm i complies with IFRS in year t, and 
zero otherwise. IFRS is included given the commonly-cited managerial sentiment that the IFRS-
reporting regime has led to a crisis of double standards in accounting (for example, Gaynor, 
2010). The impact of recent FMA (2012) guidance is also considered. FMA is a binary variable 
that takes the value one when the relevant annual report or prelim in released on or after 1 
January 2013.  
4.3.4 Control (C) explanatory variables 
Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets of firm i as reported in their year t annual 
report. Hodgson and Stevenson-Clarke (2000) suggest that as leverage increases above its 
optimal level, and the likelihood of earnings manipulations for the purpose of reducing debt 
covenant constraints increases, earning become less informative, while cash flows provide 
incremental information. As a result, investors might demand performance measures which have 
stronger ties with free cash flow concepts (such as EBITDA). On the other hand, on the level that 
encroaching covenant violations might reflect managerial underperformance, strategic disclosure 
incentives could also be associated with high levels of debt. Alternatively, debt covenants might 
actually be based on non-GAAP information (Jennings & Marques, 2011)
45
 which could also 
induce strategic disclosure. Consequently, Leverage is included as a control variable.  
LNAnalCov is the natural log of one plus the total number of I/B/E/S (Institutional Brokers’ 
Estimate System) estimates in the mean EPS forecast for firm i in year t. One could argue that 
                                                          
45
 NGEs also appear to be having an increasing role informing corporate finance decisions in New Zealand. For 
example, in Ryman Healthcare Limited’s (RYM) 2013 annual report, Chairman Dr David Kerr makes the following 
statement: “underlying profit of $100.2 million is a new record for the company and up 19% on last year”. He 
subsequently adds that “[the] underlying profit growth has driven a lift to the annual dividend by 19%”. He later 
expands “[RYM’s] intention remains to increase dividends in line with the growth in underlying profits”. 
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analyst coverage might create strategic targets, which management use non-GAAP disclosure to 
opportunistically achieve (Black & Christensen, 2009). For example, Heflin and Hsu (2008) 
contend that one reason for non-GAAP disclosure could be to enhance perceptions of 
performance by excluding expenses that analysts do not remove from their forecasts. Conversely, 
sophisticated investors may find non-GAAP reporting increasingly informative (Bowen et al., 
2005). Given conflicting interpretations, LNAnalCov is included as a control variable. 
 Zhang and Zheng (2011) also raise an argument that sophisticated investors—in their case, 
institutional owners—might place pressure on managers to make additional voluntary 
disclosures. That is, institutional ownership might be linked with investors’ demands for 
managers to informatively provide additional information about the nature of earnings. 
Alternatively, institutionally-developed environments might create pressure to meet or beat 
earnings forecasts (Isidro and Marques, 2014) leading to opportunistic disclosure. As a proxy for 
institutional ownership, the control variable Top20 is the percentage of shares held by the largest 
20 shareholders in firm i in year t.  
In addition to the two controls for investor sophistication (LNAnalCov and Top20), I also control 
for firm size (for example, Black & Christensen, 2009; Lougee & Marquardt, 2004; Marques, 
2010), where LNSize is the natural log of firm i’s total assets (expressed in thousands of dollars) 
in year t.  
Cross is a binary variable equal to one if firm i is cross-listed in year t (Isidro & Marques, 2014). 
Hitz (2010) suggests that increased oversight from multiple regulations may result in the 
production of less non-GAAP information. Alternatively, exposure to multiple clienteles, 
associated with a presence on multiple exchanges, could increase the likelihood of investors 
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demanding alternative of performance measures. Similarly, different statutory reporting 
requirements across reporting regimes could result in the generation of non-GAAP information.  
Finally, in Model 2 (𝑃[𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑢𝑚 = 1]), I control for EB metrics disclosure when considering 
the determinants of adjusted earnings disclosure. This steams from the result of Reimsbach’s 
(2014) experiment study, which finds that in the presence of EB disclosure, non-professional 
investors might react differently to adjusted earnings.  
In addition to the 161 instances where ExecuComp has compiled compensation data on less than 
three firm executives, a further four observations are additionally excluded because of data 
availability. To examine the extent to which results have the potential to be subject to sample 
selection bias, section 5.5 contrasts the summary statistics of all dependent and independent 
variables when only complete cases are considered with these summary statistics when both 
complete and incomplete cases are considered.  
4.4 Models 4–6, the determinants of reconciliation quality 
After deciding to disclose NGEs, firms must also choose whether to provide high-quality 
reconciliations. Two of the FMA (2012) guidance principles relate to reconciling non-GAAP 
information with GAAP information. Firstly, the Calculation principle calls for “a clear narrative 
explanation about how the non-GAAP financial information is calculated to be provided.” The 
Reconciliation principle suggests “a reconciliation between the non-GAAP and GAAP financial 
information should be provided, separately itemising and explaining each significant 
adjustment.” Zhang and Zheng (2011) use an ordinal measure of reconciliation quality. They 
consider reconciliations to be highest quality when a table is provided reconciling GAAP 
earnings with NGEs. An OLS regression is then used to establish the determinants of 
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reconciliation quality where the dependent variable is the logged value of one plus the ordinal 
reconciliation score.  
This study adopts a simplified version of Zhang and Zheng's (2011) reconciliation-score 
methodology (see Figure 5).
46
  
Figure 5: Reconciliation score methodology 
 
*A non-GAAP disclosure having no quantitative reconciliation does not preclude there being sufficient information 
for a reconciliation with statutory profit. For example, in the chairman’s report in EBOS Group Limited’s 2010 
annual report, Chairman Rick Christie made the following statement: “Normalised net profit was $25.4m and net 
profit after tax of $23.44m was 18.8% higher than the 2009 result of $19.73m. This included abnormal deferred tax 
charges of $1.97m”. Although no quantitative reconciliation was provided, by adjusting the statutory profit by the 
abnormal deferred tax charge these measures can be reconciled ($23.44m + $1.97m = $25.41m).  
 
Recognising the discrete nature of ordinal reconciliation scores, Models 4–6 (below) are ordered 
logistic models. As with non-GAAP disclosure (Models 1–3), all variables are for firm i and year 
t, and 𝜓[. ] represents the logistic function.  
 
                                                          
46
 After reviewing a number of non-GAAP disclosures made by companies on the NZX Main Board, I decided that a 
simplified reconciliation-score methodology would enhance the objectivity of the data-collection process.  
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(4) 𝑃[𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛 = 0, 1, 2] = 𝜓[𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑇𝑀 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔 +
𝛽5Big4 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝 +  𝛽7𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 +  𝛽8𝐹𝑀𝐴 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽10𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑣 +
 𝛽11𝑇𝑜𝑝20 + 𝛽12𝐿𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛽13𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 +  𝛽14𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑓_𝑃𝑟𝑜 + 𝛽15𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠_𝑃𝑟𝑜 +
𝜀] 
 
(5) 𝑃[𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛 = 0, 1, 2] = 𝜓[𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑇𝑀 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔 +
𝛽5Big4 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝 +  𝛽7𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 +  𝛽8𝐹𝑀𝐴 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽10𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑣 +
 𝛽11𝑇𝑜𝑝20 + 𝛽12𝐿𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛽13𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 +  𝛽14𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑓_𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒 +
 𝛽15𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠_𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝜀] 
 
(6) 𝑃[𝐸𝐵𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛 = 0, 1, 2] = 𝜓[𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑇𝑀 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔 +
𝛽5Big4 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝 +  𝛽7𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 +  𝛽8𝐹𝑀𝐴 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽10𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑣 +
 𝛽11𝑇𝑜𝑝20 + 𝛽12𝐿𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛽13𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 +  𝛽14𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑓_𝐸𝐵 +  𝛽15𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠_𝐸𝐵 + 𝜀] 
 
ProRecon= an ordinal variable equal to the lowest reconciliation score on non-GAAP 
earnings for firm i in year t, where irreconcilable non-GAAP disclosures have a 
reconciliation score of zero, reconcilable disclosures without a quantitative 
reconciliation have a score of one, and reconcilable disclosures with a quantitative 
reconciliation have a score of two; 
AdjustRecon= an ordinal variable equal to the lowest reconciliation score on adjusted earnings 
for firm i in year t, where irreconcilable adjusted earnings disclosures have a 
reconciliation score of zero, reconcilable disclosures without a quantitative 
reconciliation have a score of one, and reconcilable disclosures with a quantitative 
reconciliation have a score of two; 
EBRecon= an ordinal variable equal to the lowest reconciliation score on EB metrics for firm 
i in year t, where irreconcilable EB disclosures have a reconciliation score of 
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, reconcilable disclosures without a quantitative reconciliation have a score 
of one, and reconcilable disclosures with a quantitative reconciliation have a score 
of two. 
Note that the number of observations in each model is restricted to firm-years where NGEs, 
adjusted earnings, and EB metrics are used, respectively.  
Compared with Models 1–3, Models 4–6 include two additional explanatory variables. In 
instances where NGEs do not differ materially from statutory profit, companies may feel 
exonerated from providing high-quality reconciliations. Accordingly, ABSDif__ is the absolute 
difference between NGEs and GAAP earnings, scaled by total assets (Zhang & Zheng, 2011). 
Black and Christensen (2009), among other authors, consider replacing GAAP losses with non-
GAAP profits a strategic earnings target. Walker and Louvari (2003)  observe that firms in the 
United Kingdom appear to distract investors from losses by reporting positive alternative EPS 
numbers when losses occur. To examine the relationship between potential opportunism 
associated with managerial incentives to report positive earnings and reconciliation quality, 
ReverseLoss__
48
 is a binary variable that takes the value one when firm i has a statutory loss in 
year t but a non-GAAP profit (Zhang & Zheng, 2011).  
                                                          
47
 By definition, EB measures cannot have a reconciliation score of zero. Given that the availability of standardised 
Tax, Interest/finance charge, and Depreciation/amortisation adjustments in the income statement and notes, these 
measures can always be reconciled to statutory profit. 
48
 ABSDif__ and ReverseLoss__, differ according to whether NGEs, adjusted earnings, or EB earnings are being 
disclosed.  
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4.5 Models 7–12, the determinants of emphasis, authority, and prominence 
The FMA (2012) suggest that the order and manner in which GAAP and non-GAAP figures are 
presented is a factor when considering whether undue prominence, emphasis, or authority is 
given to non-GAAP financial information.  
The FMA (2012) guidance note cautions against giving NGEs undue prominence, emphasis, or 
authority. Intuitively, non-GAAP disclosures could be construed as having undue prominence, 
emphasis, or authority when they are not accompanied by an associated GAAP earnings 
disclosure.
49
 Evidence suggests that when non-GAAP numbers are placed before GAAP figures 
in earnings releases, less-sophisticated investors weight these numbers more heavily (Allee et al., 
2007; Elliott, 2006); therefore, this form of strategic placement might also have the potential to 
differentiate between potentially-opportunistic and informative non-GAAP disclosures. 
The logistic (𝜓[. ] ) Models 7–12, which examine non-GAAP emphasis, only consider non-
GAAP disclosures outside the scope of the financial statements; non-GAAP disclosures made in 
the income statement, tables below the income statement, and the notes to the financial 
statements are excluded given that it is not possible to make these disclosures without an 
associated statutory profit disclosure. 
The logistic Models 7–9 take the following structural form; firm and year subscripts (i and t) 
have been omitted: 
(7) 𝑃[𝑃𝑟𝑜𝐹𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑠 = 1] = 𝜓[𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑇𝑀 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔 +
𝛽5Big4 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝 +  𝛽7𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 +  𝛽8𝐹𝑀𝐴 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽10𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑣 +
 𝛽11𝑇𝑜𝑝20 + 𝛽12𝐿𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛽13𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 +  𝛽14𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠_𝑃𝑟𝑜 + 𝜀] 
                                                          
49
 This pattern of behaviour is referred to as non-GAAP Focus.  
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(8) 𝑃[𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑠 = 1] = 𝜓[𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑇𝑀 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔 +
𝛽5Big4 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝 +  𝛽7𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 +  𝛽8𝐹𝑀𝐴 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽10𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑣 +
 𝛽11𝑇𝑜𝑝20 + 𝛽12𝐿𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛽13𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 +  𝛽14𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠_𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝜀] 
 
(9) 𝑃[𝐸𝐵𝐹𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑠 = 1] = 𝜓[𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑇𝑀 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔 +
𝛽5Big4 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝 +  𝛽7𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 +  𝛽8𝐹𝑀𝐴 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽10𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑣 +
 𝛽11𝑇𝑜𝑝20 + 𝛽12𝐿𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛽13𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 +  𝛽14𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠_𝐸𝐵 + 𝜀] 
 
ProFocus = a binary variable equal to one when a non-GAAP earnings measure appears in a 
greater number of areas (narrative, table, or depiction) than statutory profit, and 
zero otherwise; 
AdjustFocus= a binary variable equal to one when an adjusted earnings measure appears in a 
greater number of areas (narrative, table, or depiction) than statutory profit, and 
zero otherwise; 
EBFocus= a binary variable equal to one when an EB metrics measure appears in a greater 
number of areas (narrative, table, or depiction) than statutory profit, and zero 
otherwise. 
The dependent variables in Models 7–9 take the value one when the number of areas (narrative, 
table, and depiction) that NGEs, adjusted earnings, and EB metrics are present, respectively, is 
greater than the number of areas where statutory profit is disclosed (for firm i in year t). That is 
to say, the binary Focus variables take the value one when a non-GAAP disclosure is not 
accompanied by statutory profit disclosure, and statutory profit has not been represented in a 
different area without the disclosure of NGEs.  
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On the right-hand side, logistic Models 10–12 are identical to Models 7–9, the only difference 
being that non-GAAP Focus variables are replaced with an alternative measure of emphasis 
(non-GAAP Before. In Models 10–12, the dependent variables ProBefore, AdjustBefore, and 
EBBefore take the value one when relevant
50
 NGEs disclosures, adjusted earnings disclosures, 
and EB disclosure occur before statutory profit disclosure, respectively, and zero otherwise.  
ProBefore = a  binary variable equal to one when firm a non-GAAP earnings measure appears 
before statutory profit, and zero otherwise; 
AdjustBefore= a  binary variable equal to one when firm an adjusted earnings measure appears 
before statutory profit, and zero otherwise; 
EBBefore= a  binary variable equal to one when firm an EB measure appears before statutory 
profit, and zero otherwise. 
4.6 The audit-fee (AF) model, and AF residual regression 
To enhance the construct validity of my results, the influence of non-GAAP disclosure on ‘fraud 
risk’ compensation is analysed without intervening effects of auditor effort. That is, using the 
audit-fee model, I isolate auditor effort (captured within the framework of the model) from 
‘fraud risk’ compensation (captured by the residuals of the model), before examining the 
relationship between non-GAAP disclosure and ‘fraud risk’ compensation (Model 14).  
                                                          
50
 In a similar fashion to Models 7–9, Models 10–12 do not consider non-GAAP disclosure made ‘inside the scope 
of the financial statements’.  
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Following Taylor and Simon (1999), I use a simple audit-fee model that controls for auditee size 
(the natural log of total assets), risk (including a Leverage and Loss),
51
 and complexity (the ratio 
of inventory and receivables to total asset, INVREC).  I also consider auditor size (Ashbaugh, 
LaFond, & Mayhew, 2003; Chen et al., 2012; Taylor & Simon, 1999; Whisenant, 
Sankaraguruswamy, & Raghunandan, 2003) using Big4.
52
 I include BTM as a proxy for growth 
(Chen et al., 2012; Whisenant et al., 2003), and control for dual-listed status (Cross). Finally, 
given that my sample captures two reporting regimes (GAAP/pre-IFRS and IFRS), I include an 
IFRS indicator variable.  
𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑅𝐸𝐶 + 𝛽5Big4 + 𝛽6Cross +
𝛽7𝐵𝑇𝑀 + 𝛽8IFRS + 𝜀                 (13) 
 
AuditFees = the natural logarithm or audit and audit related fees expressed in thousands of 
dollars for firm i in year t.    
Once audit fees are modelled, I extract the residuals from the model and regress them on non-
GAAP disclosure to examine whether auditors are being paid ‘fraud risk’ compensation for non-
GAAP opportunism. On the basis that increased scrutiny after the introduction of the FMA 
(2012) guidance might have changed the level of ‘fraud risk’ compensation for non-GAAP 
opportunism, I interact FMA with NGDum. 
𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝐷𝑢𝑚
∗ + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝐷𝑢𝑚
∗ ∗ 𝐹𝑀𝐴          (14) 
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 Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, and Loss is a binary variable equal to one when a statutory 
loss is reported in the current period, and zero otherwise.  
52
 Taylor and Simon (1999) use a Big6 dummy variable, Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and Whisenant et al. (2003) use 
Big5, and Chen et al. (2012) use Big4. After considering the dynamics of the New Zealand market over the period of 
this study, a Big4 proxy is adopted.  
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*In addition to non-GAAP disclosure, other relationships will also be examined by substituting NGDum for 
AdjustDum, EBDum, ProLNRecon, AdjustLNRecon, EBLNRecon, ProFocus, AdjustFocus, EBFocus, ProBeofre, 
AdjustBefore, and EBBefore. When reconciliation qualities are examined, the natural log of one plus the 
reconciliation score is used.   
𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠∗ = the residuals from Model 13 for firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡. 
As a reference, all variables introduced in Chapter 4 are defined in Table 22 (Appendices). To 




 percentiles (e.g., 
Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Bradshaw & Sloan, 2002; Doyle et al., 2013; Lougee & Marquardt, 
2004).
53 
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 percentiles.  




Chapter 5 – The Sample Descriptive Statistics  
  
5.1. Annual report non-GAAP earnings disclosure 
 
Table 1 (below) shows that in 81% of firm-years, NGEs are disclosed in annual reports, 
highlighting the prevalence of non-GAAP reporting in New Zealand. After excluding EB 
metrics, more than half of firm-years still include non-GAAP disclosures (adjusted earnings).  
For the subsample of firms that make non-GAAP disclosure, a reconciliation score of two is 
assigned when a quantitative table reconciles non-GAAP and statutory profit, one when no 
quantitative reconciliation exists but reconciliation is still possible (e.g., adjustments are 
explicitly stated in the management narrative), and zero when non-GAAP and statutory profit 
cannot be reconciled.
54
  In over 15% of firm-years where annual report non-GAAP disclosures 
are made, the NGEs are irreconcilable. In almost a quarter (a total of 150) of firm-years with 
adjusted earnings disclosures, these disclosures cannot be reconciled. This suggests that it is not 
uncommon for managers to fail to provide sufficient information to identify non-GAAP 
adjustments.  
The variable Focus takes the value one when a relevant non-GAAP disclosure is not 
accompanied by a statutory profit disclosure in that same area, and statutory profit has not been 
represented in a different area without the disclosure of NGEs. An analysis of my sample reveals 
that in over one-fifth (21%) of annual reports, where non-GAAP disclosures occurs, a NGEs 
measure is disclosed without an accompanying statutory profit disclosure. Adjusted earnings 
Focus (22%) occurs more frequently than NGEs Focus, while EB Focus is slightly less likely at 
only 16%.  
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 As Tax, Interest/finance charges, and Depreciation/amortisation adjustments can be sourced from the income 
statement or supplementary notes, EB earnings can only have reconciliation scores of one or two.  




Table 1: Annual report NGEs descriptive statistics 
Panel A.  Frequency of non-GAAP disclosures         
         
  
NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
 
  
Disc = 0 Disc = 1 Disc = 0 Disc = 1 Disc = 0 Disc = 1 
 N 
 
221 967 523 665 600 588 
 % 
 
18.6% 81.4% 44.0% 56.0% 50.5% 49.5% 
 
         Panel B.  Non-GAAP disclosure reconciliation quality       
         
    
Reconciliation score of two 
  
         
  
NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
 N 
 
612 365 509 
 % 
 
63.3% 54.9% 86.6% 
 
         
    
Reconciliation score of one 
  
         
  
NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
 N 
 
205 150 79 
 % 
 
21.2% 22.6% 13.4% 
 
         
    
Reconciliation score of zero 
  
         
  
NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
 N 
 
150 150 0 
 % 
 
15.5% 22.6% 0.0% 
 
         Panel C.  Non-GAAP disclosure Focus         
         
  
NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
 
  
Focus= 0 Focus= 1 Focus= 0 Focus= 1 Focus= 0 Focus= 1 
 N 
 
702 189 462 134 449 83 
 % 
 
78.8% 21.2% 77.5% 22.5% 84.4% 15.6% 
 
         Panel D.  Non-GAAP disclosure Before         
         
  
NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
 
  









641 250 414 182 432 100 
 % 
 
71.9% 28.1% 69.5% 30.5% 81.2% 18.8% 
 




As an alternative measure of emphasis to Focus,  determinants of disclosing NGEs before 
statutory profit disclosure are also examined. This does not include instances where non-GAAP 
disclosures appear above statutory profit in the same tables of highlights, or the same paragraph 
or set of bullet points in management’s narrative discussion, given that these disclosures could be 
construed as occurring simultaneously with statutory profit. In 28% of firm-years where NGEs 
are used, NGEs appear prior to statutory profit. In a similar fashion to the emphasis conveyed by 
Focus, adjusted earnings disclosures are more likely to occur prior to statutory profit than EB 
disclosures in annual reports.  
Collectively, this documented presence of non-GAAP emphasis (Focus and Before) could be a 
cause of alarm, given that strategic placement of NGEs could have an unintentional cognitive 
effect on non-professional investors’ decision making (Allee et al., 2007; Elliott, 2006).  
5.2 Prelim non-GAAP earnings disclosure 
 
NGEs disclosures could be less likely in prelims, as they are typically much shorter than annual 
reports. Consistent with this notion, I find that non-GAAP disclosure is slightly less frequent in 
prelims at 76% (see Table 2), compared with the 81% of annual report firm-years containing 
NGEs. Compared with annual reports, in prelims there is only a modest reduction in the 
proportion of firm-years where adjusted earnings are disclosed; 56% and 53% of annual report 
and prelims contain adjusted earnings, respectively. The levels of EB metrics disclosure between 








Table 2: Prelim NGEs descriptive statistics 
Panel A.  Frequency of non-GAAP disclosures 
         
  
NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
 
  
Disc = 0 Disc = 1 Disc = 0 Disc = 1 Disc = 0 Disc = 1 
 N 
 
287 894 551 630 694 487 
 % 
 
24.3% 75.7% 46.7% 53.3% 58.8% 41.2% 
 
         Panel B.  Non-GAAP disclosure reconciliation quality 
         
    
Reconciliation score of two 
  
         
  
NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
 N 
 
483 301 383 
 % 
 
54.0% 47.8% 78.6% 
 
         
    
Reconciliation score of one 
  
         
  
NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
 N 
 
246 165 104 
 % 
 
27.5% 26.2% 21.4% 
 
         
    
Reconciliation score of zero 
  
         
  
NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
 N 
 
165 164 0 
 % 
 
18.5% 26.0% 0.0% 
 
         Panel C.  Non-GAAP disclosure Focus 
         
  
NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
 
  
Focus= 0 Focus= 1 Focus= 0 Focus= 1 Focus= 0 Focus= 1 
 N 
 
687 153 477 112 368 59 
 % 
 
81.8% 18.2% 81.0% 19.0% 86.2% 13.8% 
  
It might be that managers looking to provide a concise summary of performance in their prelims 
are more reluctant to omit adjusted earnings than EB measures, given that the discretionary 
nature of adjustments means that they can generally not be identified without management 




guidance. This difference could also result from managers catering to different annual and prelim 
clienteles. Bence, Hapeshi, and Hussey (1995) find that prelims are the most important 
information source for investment analysts, but only the 5
th




Similar arguments could be put forward for reconciliation quality (or lack thereof) which appears 
to be slightly worse in prelims than annual reports; 26% of adjusted earnings disclosed in prelims 
cannot be reconciled compared with 23% in annual reports. 
Non-GAAP Focus is slightly less pronounced in prelims at 18%, compared with 21% in annual 
reports. One reason for this result could be that annual reports may be more likely to be multi-
faceted (contain tables and depictions as well as a narrative), presenting more opportunities for 
non-GAAP disclosure without an associated appearance of statutory profit.  
During the data collection process, it was observed that prelims often involved the filing of more 
than one document. As a result, it was not always possible to objectively identify whether non-
GAAP earnings were disclosed prior to statutory profit. Accordingly, Before is not examined in 
the context of prelims.   
5.3 Annual report non-GAAP earnings disclosure by year  
  
Throughout the remainder of this chapter and during the univariate analysis in Chapter 6, I 
simplify the concept of reconciliation quality by collectively referring to disclosures with a 
reconciliation score of either one or two as “reconcilable”.   
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 In general, these authors—who examine the information sources sophisticated investors use—find that compared 
with institutional investors, investment analysts prefer shorter-term information.  




The FMA (2012) guidance relates to all 2013 fiscal-year annual reports and preliminary earnings 
announcements, and a small number of 2012 fiscal-year results not released until on or after 1 
January 2013. When non-GAAP reporting is analysed by year, I find that approximately 86% of 
firms disclose NGEs in the 2013 year (see Figure 6).
56
 This level of NGEs disclosure does not 
appear to be dissimilar to pre-FMA (2012) guidance levels. This is not misaligned with the 
intentions of the guidance note, which was not intended to curb disclosure, but rather to ensure 
transparent disclosure that does not overemphasise non-GAAP information.  
 
Figure 6: Annual report NGEs disclosure, reconciliation, Focus, and Before by year 
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 This level of disclosure seems broadly consistent with Deloitte (2014), who survey the annual reports of 100 New 
Zealand companies in 2013 and find that 90% used non-GAAP measures. 




In contrast to media comments, I find no noticeable increase in the level of disclosure around 
IFRS adoption (2005–2007)—the level of disclosure appears to be relatively stable across time—
although I leave the formal testing of this result to Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. In the 2013 year, 
89% of annual report non-GAAP disclosures are reconcilable.
57
 While this is a sharp increase 
compared with 2012, similar proportions of NGEs’ reconciliation is observed in 2005, 2009, and 
2010, which raises concerns about the adherence to the FMA’s (2012) guidance. 
During 2013, NGEs Focus appears to have decreased substantially. While disclosure Before 
continues to decline after peaking at 38.4% in 2010. This is consistent with the FMA (2012) 
guidance reducing the emphasis placed on NGEs.  
Decomposing NGEs into adjusted earnings and EB metrics (Table 3, below) a different pattern 
emerges from when NGEs are collectively considered. While annual report non-GAAP reporting 
as a whole appears to be relatively constant, over time adjusted earnings disclosure appears to 
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 Based on their survey of 100 firms, Deloitte (2014) find that in the 2013 financial year 81% of the 251 non-GAAP 
measures disclosed can be reconciled to an income statement line item. Given that here a firm-level analysis is 
conducted—firms might have multiple non-GAAP disclosures but only the lowest reconciliation score is 
considered—my results are not directly comparable. However, broadly speaking the finding that in almost 89% of 
firms all non-GAAP earnings measures can be reconciled in these firms’ 2013 annual report seem to be in line with 
Deloitte’s (2014) analysis.  
 




Table 3: Annual report NGEs descriptive statistics by year 








Obs N=1 % 
 
Obs N=1 % 
 
Obs N=1 % 
2004 125 100 80.0 
 
125 65 52.0 
 
125 60 48.0 
2005 124 97 78.2 
 
124 59 47.6 
 
124 68 54.8 
2006 123 101 82.1 
 
123 56 45.5 
 
123 70 56.9 
2007 120 94 78.3 
 
120 54 45.0 
 
120 67 55.8 
2008 118 89 75.4 
 
118 61 51.7 
 
118 56 47.5 
2009 116 91 78.5 
 
116 63 54.3 
 
116 55 47.4 
2010 117 97 82.9 
 
117 75 64.1 
 
117 54 46.2 
2011 115 98 85.2 
 
115 78 67.8 
 
115 56 48.7 
2012 117 103 88.0 
 
117 81 69.2 
 
117 56 47.9 
2013 113 97 85.8 
 
113 73 64.6 
 
113 46 40.7 
            




Adjusted earnings Reconcilable 
    
 
Obs N ≥1 % 
 
Obs N ≥1 % 
    2004 100 84 84.0 
 
65 49 75.4 
    2005 97 86 88.7 
 
59 48 81.4 
    2006 101 85 84.2 
 
56 40 71.4 
    2007 94 77 81.9 
 
54 37 68.5 
    2008 89 73 82.0 
 
61 45 73.8 
    2009 91 80 87.9 
 
63 52 82.5 
    2010 97 84 86.6 
 
75 62 82.7 
    2011 98 80 81.6 
 
78 60 76.9 
   2012 103 82 79.6 
 
81 60 74.1 
   2013 97 86 88.7 
 
73 62 84.9 
    
            








Obs N=1 % 
 
Obs N=1 % 
 
Obs N=1 % 
2004 96 19 19.8 
 
64 14 21.9 
 
51 5 9.8 
2005 94 21 22.3 
 
57 15 26.3 
 
62 12 19.4 
2006 96 21 21.9 
 
54 13 24.1 
 
64 11 17.2 
2007 86 18 20.9 
 
49 11 22.5 
 
60 8 13.3 
2008 81 15 18.5 
 
53 10 18.9 
 
51 6 11.8 
2009 81 14 17.3 
 
53 10 18.9 
 
52 6 11.5 
2010 86 20 23.3 
 
62 14 22.6 
 
50 12 24.0 
2011 91 24 26.4 
 
67 16 23.9 
 
52 13 25.0 
2012 92 23 25.0 
 
70 19 27.1 
 
50 8 16.0 
2013 88 14 15.9 
 
67 12 17.9 
 
40 2 5.0 
            
            












Obs N=1 % 
 
Obs N=1 % 
 
Obs N=1 % 
2004 96 23 24.0 
 
64 15 23.4 
 
51 8 15.7 
2005 94 19 20.2 
 
57 13 22.8 
 
62 13 21.0 
2006 96 30 31.3 
 
54 20 37.0 
 
64 13 20.3 
2007 86 26 30.2 
 
49 18 36.7 
 
60 12 20.0 
2008 81 19 23.5 
 
53 16 30.2 
 
51 5 9.8 
2009 81 26 32.1 
 
53 20 37.7 
 
52 8 15.4 
2010 86 33 38.4 
 
62 27 43.6 
 
50 11 22.0 
2011 91 31 34.1 
 
67 20 29.9 
 
52 17 32.7 
2012 92 23 25.0 
 
70 17 24.3 
 
50 8 16.0 
2013 88 20 22.7 
 
67 16 23.9 
 
40 5 12.5 
   
One potential explanation for this result could be the increasing use of adjusted EB metrics
58
— 
this study considers adjusted EB metrics to be adjusted earnings disclosures—as replacements 
for traditional EB metrics. The increase in adjusted earnings appears to coincide with the 
introduction of the IFRS reporting regime.
59
 This is consistent with the concerns expressed by 
firms and the media that fair value adjustments under IFRS have led to increased non-GAAP 
disclosure. It appears that the FMA guidance has led to a sharp decline in the proportion of firms 
making EB disclosures, and a modest decrease in adjusted earnings disclosures. 
The frequency of reconcilable annual report NGEs and adjusted earnings increases around the 
introduction of the FMA (2012) guidance, with adjusted earnings reconcilable in 85% of the 
firm-years, where they are disclosed, for the 2013 fiscal year, compared with only 74% in the 
2012 fiscal year. This could suggest that firms have responded to the FMA’s (2012) guidance 
surrounding reconciliation.  
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 For example, section 2.4 discusses how the number of non-GAAP measures with EBITDAF in the title has risen 
from none in 2004 to eight in the 2013 year.  
59
Voluntary adoption of NZ IFRS was permitted in 2005, while mandatory adoption was required in 2007.  




In 2013, a large drop in annual report firm-years where non-GAAP disclosures were not 
accompanied by statutory profit is evident; the frequency of adjusted earnings Focus fell roughly 
9% (27% to 18%) in 2013 and EB Focus decreased by 11% (16% to 5%). This reduction in non-
GAAP emphasis post-FMA (2012) guidance is corroborated by the fall in Before in the last two 
fiscal years of the sample.  
5.4 Prelim non-GAAP earnings disclosure by year 
 
When prelims are studied (Table 4), non-GAAP reporting appears to be consistently rising, again 
primarily fuelled by the increased use of adjusted earnings. Further comparing Table 3 and Table 
4, it appears that EB disclosure is not nearly as common in prelims as annual reports. In the first 
year of the sample, only 34% of firms disclose EB metrics in their prelims, compared with 48% 
in their annual reports.  
Compared with the annual reports, the FMA (2012) guidance appears to have had a weaker 
influence on reconciliation quality in prelims, where reconcilable non-GAAP firm-years 
increased only 2% from 2012 to 2013 (82% to 84%). In prelims, only adjusted earnings Focus 
falls in the 2013 fiscal year (from 19% to 14%), while EB Focus is relatively robust to the FMA 
(2012) guidance. Given that it has been argued that adjusted earnings have the most 









Table 4: Prelim NGEs descriptive statistics by year 
Panel A.  Frequency of non-GAAP disclosures by year N (%) 
 
NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
 
Obs N=1 % Obs N=1 % Obs N=1 % 
2004 119 81 68.1 119 55 46.2 119 41 34.5 
2005 120 80 66.7 120 51 42.5 120 44 36.7 
2006 123 86 69.9 123 52 42.3 123 57 46.3 
2007 121 89 73.6 121 55 45.5 121 57 47.1 
2008 118 84 71.2 118 58 49.2 118 47 39.8 
2009 116 89 76.7 116 61 52.6 116 47 40.5 
2010 116 94 81.0 116 71 61.2 116 49 42.2 
2011 117 97 82.9 117 75 64.1 117 54 46.2 
2012 118 99 83.9 118 80 67.8 118 51 43.2 
2013 113 95 84.1 113 72 63.7 113 40 35.4 
          Panel B.  Reconcilable non-GAAP disclosures by year N (%)         
 
NGEs Adjusted earnings 
  
 
Obs N ≥1 % Obs N ≥1 % 
   2004 81 64 79.0 55 38 69.1 
   2005 80 69 86.3 51 40 78.4 
   2006 86 68 79.1 52 35 67.3 
   2007 89 68 76.4 55 34 61.8 
   2008 84 65 77.4 58 39 67.2 
   2009 89 69 77.5 61 41 67.2 
   2010 94 80 85.1 71 57 80.3 
   2011 97 85 87.6 75 63 84.0 
  2012 99 81 81.8 80 62 77.5 
  2013 95 80 84.2 72 57 79.2 
   
          Panel C.  Non-GAAP disclosure Focus by year N (%) 
 
NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
 
Obs N=1 % Obs N=1 % Obs N=1 % 
2004 79 12 15.2 55 8 14.6 36 5 13.9 
2005 79 13 16.5 50 10 20.0 42 4 9.5 
2006 84 16 19.1 50 12 24.0 53 8 15.1 
2007 82 15 18.3 52 10 19.2 48 7 14.6 
2008 78 12 15.4 55 7 12.7 41 6 14.6 
2009 81 16 19.8 55 12 21.8 40 5 12.5 
2010 87 19 21.8 67 14 20.9 43 8 18.6 
2011 90 18 20.0 67 16 23.9 45 5 11.1 
2012 93 18 19.4 73 14 19.2 45 6 13.3 
2013 87 14 16.1 65 9 13.9 34 5 14.7 




Collectively, these prelim results again point to increases in adjusted earnings disclosure 
following the introduction of IFRS, and higher reconciliation quality and less non-GAAP 
emphasis post-FMA (2012) guidance. Although relative to annual report changes, increases in 
reconciliation quality and decreases in non-GAAP emphasis appear relatively muted in the 
prelims. This raises concerns about whether firms have been less responsive to the FMA’s 
(2012) guidance in communications with investors that do not share the same visibility as annual 
reports.  
 
5.5 Independent variable descriptive statistics and selection bias  
 
Due to incomplete cases (including the 161 firm-years where less than three executives have 
compensation data, as profiled by ExecuComp), 165 firm-years are excluded from regression 
Models 1–3. The resulting dataset is hereafter referred to as the complete-case dataset. 
Consequently, when all available data are considered, this will be referred to as the incomplete-
case dataset.  
To examine the potential for exclusions to create sample selection bias, the dependent variables 
are compared across the incomplete-case dataset of 1,188 annual report firm-years (Table 1, 
above) and the complete-case dataset of 1,023 annual report firm-years (Table 23 – Appendices). 
The dependent variable proportions are highly robust to the exclusion of incomplete cases.  
I also contrast independent variables in the complete- and incomplete-case datasets (Table 5 and 
Table 24 – Appendices, respectively). For meaningful interpretation, AnalCov and Size have 
been presented rather than LNAnalCov and LNSize. When only the 1,023 complete-case firm-
years are considered, BTM is 0.74, compared with 0.75 in the incomplete-case dataset (1,178 




observations). For the sample of complete cases, at the median Intang is only 0.05, however, at 
the 90
th
 percentile intangibles represent over half of firms’ total assets. MktComp is zero even at 
the 90
th
 percentile, given that in only 7.1% of firm-years (73) profiled executives are paid in 
stock and options. The mean percentage of compensation paid to executives as stock and options 
is only 1%. The mean ratio of total liabilities to total assets (Leverage) is 0.47. That is, on 
average debt represents a little under half of firms’ capital (according to their balance sheets).  
Table 5: Explanatory variable descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Summary statistics of continuous variables 
This panel reports the summary statistics for the continuous variables in Models 1-3. Summary statistics are 
calculated over the 1023 annual report observations used in Table 6. Note that BTM has been winsorised at the 
5th and 95th percentiles, while all other continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. For 
meaningful interpretation, AnalCov is expressed as the total number of I/B/E/S (Institutional Brokers’ Estimate 
System) estimates in the mean EPS forecast for firm i in year t, Size is the total assets of firm i in year t 
expressed in millions of dollars. 
           Variables N Mean Std Dev Min 10th Pctl 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl 90th Pctl Max 
BTM 1023 0.74 0.54 0.05 0.17 0.34 0.61 1.00 1.61 2.09 
Intang 1023 0.16 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.24 0.51 0.85 
MktComp 1023 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 
Leverage 1023 0.47 0.27 0.01 0.16 0.29 0.46 0.63 0.75 1.80 
AnalCov 1023 2.01 2.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 3.00 6.00 12.00 
Top20 1023 0.69 0.19 0.06 0.44 0.57 0.72 0.85 0.90 0.98 
Size 1023 757 1545 0 7 30 144 518 2527 7503 
           Panel B: Summary statistics of dichotomous variables 
This panel reports the summary statistics for the dichotomous variables in Models 1-3. 
           Variables N X = 1 %  
       Tech 1023 115 11.2 
       PriorLoss 1023 210 20.5 
       Big4 1023 857 83.8 
       IFRS 1023 705 68.9 
       FMA 1023 114 11.1 
       Cross 1023 183 17.9 
        




At the median, firms have no analyst coverage in the incomplete-case dataset, but one analyst 
estimate when only complete cases are examined. On further investigation, this appears to be 
because approximately half of the samples have no analyst coverage under both scenarios. The 
percentage of shares held by the top 20 shareholders (Top20) is robust to the exclusion of 
incomplete cases at 69%. On average firm-years have total assets of $757 million (complete 
cases), although the median firm-year only has assets of $144. The smallest firm in the sample 
has total assets of just $492,000. Excluding incomplete cases, the dichotomous variables exhibit 
more obvious differences. Most notably, the proportion of PriorLoss firms decreases from 22.1% 
to 20.5%, and the proportion of IFRS observations increases from 65.7% to 68.9%.  
I formally test for statistically-significant differences between the incomplete-case dataset (Table 
24 – Appendices) and the complete-case dataset (Table 5, above). Using t-tests for differences in 
the means and normal approximations to the binomial distribution for differences in proportions, 
I fail to find any significant differences exist.
 60
 Therefore, I conclude that independent variable 
sample characteristics are robust to the exclusion of incomplete-case firm-years. Accordingly, 
evidence would suggest that sample selection bias is unlikely to materially influence my results.  
5.6 Detecting multicollinearity  
 
Bowerman (2005) suggests that multicollinearity might be “seriously influencing” estimates 
when the largest variance inflation factor is greater than 10, or the mean variance inflation factor 
is considerably greater than one—on the basis that variance inflation factors are bounded with a 
lower limit of one when the R-square from regressing an explanatory variable on all other 
explanatory variables is equal to zero. Here the largest variance inflation factor is 3.80 and the 
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 It is important to note that these tests violate assumptions regarding independence.  




mean is 1.56 (Table 25); therefore, based on variance inflation factors, there is no evidence to 
suggest that multicollinearity is an issue.  
Second, I look for multicollinearity in all possible combinations of two independent variables by 
examining simple correlation coefficients. Here, Bowerman (2005) advocates that when a 
correlation coefficient exceeds 0.9, the multicollinearity between two independent variables can 
be severe. The maximum Pearson correlation coefficient (in absolute terms) is 0.57 (see 









Chapter 6 – Univariate Results and Discussion 
 
6.1 Conducting a univariate analysis  
 
When analysing differences in proportions between GAAP (pre-IFRS) and IFRS reporting 
regimes, it is important not to capture any effects related to the introduction of the FMA (2012) 
guidance. Similarly, analysing differences in proportions pre- and post-FMA (2012) guidance, it 
is important not to capture any effects of the transition between pre-IFRS and IFRS reporting 
regimes that might have taken time to materialise. For example, several authors have argued that 
Australian firms were poorly prepared for the transition to IFRS (Goodwin, Coper, & Johl, 2008; 
Jones & Higgins, 2006). Given that in their September 2012 guidance note, the FMA (2012) 
state that they will assess non-GAAP financial information against their guidance from 1 January 
2013, for the purpose of comparing GAAP/IFRS proportions the IFRS sample is only extended 
as far as disclosures made in the 2012 year.
61
 To minimise the chances of slow-to-materialise 
changes from IFRS adoption being included in the analysis of pre- and post-FMA (2012) 
guidance, the pre-FMA (2012) guidance sample is only extended back as far as the 2010 fiscal 





                                                          
61
 It is important to note that some firms-years with fiscal years ending in 2012 make annual report announcements 
and/or prelims in the 2013 year and therefore are excluded from the comparison of GAAP/IFRS proportions. 
Similarly, when pre-/post-FMA (2012) proportions are compared, some disclosures relating late 2012 fiscal year 
ends are classified as post-FMA (2012) guidance. 




6.2 Annual report non-GAAP earnings disclosure by IFRS 
 
Table 6: Annual report NGEs proportions by IFRS reporting regime 
This table reports differences in annual report proportions pre- and post-IFRS. To test the 
equality of proportions two-sided standard Wald asymptotic tests have been conducted. 
Statistical significance is measured at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels, with 
asymptotic standard errors reported in the parentheses below. 
Panel A.  Difference in proportion of non-GAAP disclosures by reporting regime N (%) 
        
  
      NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
  
Pre-IFRS IFRS Pre-IFRS IFRS Pre-IFRS IFRS 
Observations 
 
406 657 406 657 406 657 
N=1 
 
310 549 184 401 205 329 
Proportion (N=1) 0.764 0.836 0.453 0.610 0.505 0.501 
Dif (Post - Pre) 0.072*** 0.157*** -0.004 
ASE 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
        Panel B.  Reconcilable non-GAAP disclosures by reporting regime N (%) 
        
  
      NGEs Adjusted earnings 
  
  
Pre-IFRS IFRS Pre-IFRS IFRS 
  Observations 
 
310 549 184 401 
  N=1 
 
263 459 137 311 
  Proportion (N=1) 0.848 0.836 0.745 0.776 
  Dif (Post - Pre) -0.012 0.031 




        Panel C.  Non-GAAP disclosure Focus by reporting regime N (%) 
        
  
      NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
  
Pre-IFRS IFRS Pre-IFRS IFRS Pre-IFRS IFRS 
Observations 
 
298 495 179 344 182 304 
N=1 
 
66 106 44 75 32 48 
Proportion (N=1) 0.221 0.214 0.246 0.218 0.176 0.158 
Dif (Post - Pre) -0.007 -0.028 -0.018 
ASE 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
        Panel D.  Non-GAAP disclosure Before by reporting regime N (%) 
        
  
      NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
  
Pre-IFRS IFRS Pre-IFRS IFRS Pre-IFRS IFRS 
Observations 
 
298 495 179 344 182 304 
N=1 
 
70 159 45 120 37 57 
Proportion (N=1) 0.235 0.321 0.251 0.349 0.203 0.188 
Dif (Post - Pre) 0.086*** 0.097** -0.016 
ASE 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 





Results from my univariate analysis suggest that there is a significant difference in the proportion 
of firm-years where NGEs are disclosed in annual reports between pre-IFRS and IFRS reporting 
regimes. This difference is statistically significant at a level of 1%.  In particular, adjusted 
earnings disclosure has increased post-IFRS, while I fail to find a significant difference in EB 
metrics disclosure. This evidence is consistent with the large number of annual report 
commentaries, which suggest that IFRS fair value treatment is a major motivation for non-GAAP 
disclosure. Considering firm-years where NGEs are disclosed, I fail to find evidence that there is 
a difference in the proportion of firm-years where NGEs are reconcilable between pre-IFRS and 
IFRS reporting regimes. When the emphasis of NGEs is examined, considering firm-years where 
NGEs are disclosed in a narrative, table, or depiction, there is no evidence of a significant 
difference in the proportions of firm-years with NGEs Focus between pre-IFRS and IFRS. In 
contrast, post-IFRS NGEs are more likely to be disclosed before statutory profit. In a similar 
manner to disclosure, these results appear to be attributable to adjusted earnings Before. This 
evidence appears consistent with a view advocated by Gaynor (2010) that many practitioners do 
not believe that IFRS information accurately reflects company performance.  
In summary of section 6.2, I find univariate evidence that there has been an increase in the 
proportion of firm-years where NGEs are disclosed post-IFRS, and these NGEs are more likely 
to be emphasised. These results appear to be attributable to adjusted earnings, which might 
validate the management commentaries (discussed in section 2.4) which suggest that IFRS fair 
value treatment is a major motivation for NGEs disclosure.  
 




6.3 Prelim non-GAAP earnings disclosure by IFRS 
 
In addition to the annual report evidence, I find there is a significant difference in the proportion 
of firm-years where NGEs are disclosed in prelims between pre-IFRS and IFRS reporting 
regimes.  
Table 7: Prelim NGEs proportions by IFRS reporting regime 
This table reports differences in proportions pre- and post-IFRS. To test the equality of proportions two-
sided Wald asymptotic tests have been conducted. Statistical significance in measured at the 10% (*), 
5% (**), and 1% (***) levels, with asymptotic standard errors reported in the parentheses below.  
Panel A.  Difference in proportion of non-GAAP disclosures by reporting regime N (%) 
         
  
      NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
 
  
Pre-IFRS IFRS Pre-IFRS IFRS Pre-IFRS IFRS 
 Observations 
 
398 657 398 657 398 657 
 N=1 
 
263 524 164 388 152 285 
 Proportion (N=1) 0.661 0.798 0.412 0.591 0.382 0.434 
 Dif (Post - Pre) 
 
0.137*** 0.179*** 0.052* 
 ASE 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
         Panel B.  Reconcilable non-GAAP disclosures by reporting regime N (%)     
         
  
      NGEs Adjusted earnings 
   
  
Pre-IFRS IFRS Pre-IFRS IFRS 
   Observations 
 
263 524 164 388 
   N=1 
 
215 424 117 288 
   Proportion (N=1) 0.817 0.809 0.713 0.742 
   Dif (Post - Pre) 
 
-0.008 0.029 
   ASE 
 
(0.03) (0.04) 
   
         Panel C.  Non-GAAP disclosure Focus by reporting regime N (%)       
         
  
      NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
 
  
Pre-IFRS IFRS Pre-IFRS IFRS Pre-IFRS IFRS 
 Observations 
 
254 488 161 358 135 249 
 N=1 
 
43 91 31 68 20 32 
 Proportion (N=1) 0.169 0.186 0.193 0.190 0.148 0.129 
 Dif (Post - Pre) 
 
0.017 -0.003 -0.02 
 ASE 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
  




Relative to the annual report differences, the magnitude of this difference has increased; prior to 
IFRS only 41% of prelim firm-years contain adjusted earnings, after the introduction of IFRS 
59% firms-years do. Unlike the annual report dataset, where a negative and insignificant 
difference in the proportion firm-years where EB metrics are disclosed, there is weak evidence 
that EB disclosure has increased post-IFRS. As in section 6.2, considering firm-years where 
NGEs are disclosed, I fail to find evidence that there is a difference in the proportion of firm-
years where NGEs are reconcilable between pre-IFRS and IFRS reporting regimes. I fail to find 
evidence of a significant change in the proportion of firm-years with NGEs Focus. Although 
because NGEs Before are not considered,
62
 it is possible that a latent increase in NGEs emphasis 
has occurred.  
Summarising the results of sections 6.2 and 6.3, my univariate analysis suggests that there is a 
significant difference in the proportion of firm-years where NGEs are disclosed between IFRS 
and pre-IFRS reporting regimes. In addition, I provide annual report evidence that, considering 
firm-years where NGEs are disclosed in a narrative, table, or depiction, there is a difference in 
the proportion of firm-years where NGEs are emphasised between pre-IFRS and IFRS. More 
specifically, I find evidence that post-IFRS non-GAAP disclosure and emphasis
63
 have 
increased. These increases appear to be concentrated towards adjusted earnings. One explanation 
for this result could be that non-GAAP disclosure and emphasis are a response to IFRS fair value 
treatment.  
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Notably, in the annual report dataset NGEs Before increased post-IFRS. NGEs Before is omitted from the prelim 
dataset on the basis that prelims appear to frequently involve the filing of multiple documents.  
63
Evidence of increased emphasis post-IFRS is supported by a significant increase NGEs Before but I fail to find 
evidence of significant differences in NGEs Focus. 




6.4 Annual report non-GAAP earnings disclosure by FMA  
 
Table 8: Annual report NGEs proportions by FMA (2012) guidance 
This table reports differences in annual report proportions pre- and post-FMA (2012) guidance. To test 
the equality of proportions two-sided standard Wald asymptotic tests have been conducted. Statistical 
significance is measured at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels, with asymptotic standard errors 
reported in the parentheses below. 
Panel A.  Difference in proportion of non-GAAP disclosures by FMA (2012) guidance N (%) 
         
  
      NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
 
  
Pre-FMA FMA Pre-FMA FMA Pre-FMA FMA 
 Observations 
 
337 125 337 125 336.887 125 
 N=1 
 
287 108 227 80 158 54 
 Proportion (N=1) 0.852 0.864 0.674 0.640 0.469 0.432 
 Dif (Post - Pre) 
 
0.012 -0.034 -0.037 
 ASE 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
 
         Panel B.  Reconcilable non-GAAP disclosures by FMA (2012) guidance N (%) 
         
  
      NGEs Adjusted earnings 
   
  
Pre-FMA FMA Pre-FMA FMA 
   Observations 
 
287 108 227 80 
   N=1 
 
237 95 177 67 
   Proportion (N=1) 0.826 0.880 0.780 0.838 
   Dif (Post - Pre) 
 
0.054 0.058 
   ASE 
 
(0.04) (0.05) 
   
         Panel C.  Non-GAAP disclosure Focus by FMA (2012) guidance N (%) 
         
  
      NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
 
  
Pre-FMA FMA Pre-FMA FMA Pre-FMA FMA 
 Observations 
 
259 98 193 73 146 46 
 N=1 
 
64 17 46 15 32 3 
 Proportion (N=1) 0.247 0.173 0.238 0.205 0.219 0.065 
 Dif (Post - Pre) 
 
-0.074 -0.033 -0.154*** 
 ASE 
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
 
         Panel D.  Non-GAAP disclosure Before by FMA (2012) guidance N (%) 
         
  
      NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
 
  
Pre-FMA FMA Pre-FMA FMA Pre-FMA FMA 
 Observations 
 
259 98 193 73 146 46 
 N=1 
 
86 21 63 17 35 6 
 Proportion (N=1) 0.332 0.214 0.326 0.233 0.240 0.130 
 Dif (Post - Pre) 
 
-0.118** -0.094 -0.109* 
 ASE 
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
  




I fail to find a significant difference in the proportion of firm-years where NGEs are disclosed 
between pre- and post-FMA (2012) guidance periods (Table 8, above). It is important to note 
that this was not the intention of the FMA’s (2012) guidance. Rather, the FMA (2012) guidance 
note defines non-GAAP information and expresses the FMA’s views on how such information 
should be presented.  
The FMA (2012) guidance note sets out expectations that firms provide a reconciliation between 
non-GAAP and GAAP financial information, and that the presentation of non-GAAP 
information occurs without undue prominence, emphasis, or authority. 
Considering firm-years where NGEs are disclosed, the proportion of reconcilable adjusted 
earnings firm-years has increased 5.8% post-FMA (2012) guidance. Statistically speaking, I fail 
to find a difference in the proportion of firm-years where NGEs are reconcilable between pre- 




Considering firm-years where EB metrics are disclosed in a narrative, table, or depiction, at a 
level of significance of 1%, I find that there is a decrease in the proportion of firm-years EB 
metrics are disclosed with Focus between pre- and post-FMA (2012) guidance periods. There is 
also weak evidence of a difference in the proportion of firm-years where EB metrics are 
disclosed before statutory profit. I fail to find evidence of a difference in the proportion of 
adjusted earnings disclosed before statutory profit. However, in a one-tailed test for equality 
(where the null hypothesised that post-FMA [2012] guidance there would be less non-GAAP 
emphasis), at a level of significance of 10%, there would be evidence the proportion of firm-
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It is worth noting that firms might be slow to adjust to the FMA’s (2012) guidance and over time benefits not 
captured within my sample period might materialise.  




years where adjusted earnings are disclosed before statutory profit is less post-FMA (2012) 
guidance.  
To summarise section 6.4, I fail to find evidence that there is a significant difference in the 
proportion of annual report NGEs disclosures or reconcilable disclosures post-FMA (2012) 
guidance. In contrast, I do find some evidence that when relevant NGEs disclosures are made 
there is a significant difference in the proportion of firm-years where these disclosures are 
emphasised. Both EB Focus and EB Before corroborate that post-FMA (2012) guidance there is 
decreased EB metrics emphasis. Contrastingly, I fail to find evidence of less adjusted earnings 
emphasis post-FMA (2012) guidance. Consequently, to the extent that EB metrics have the least 
opportunistic potential, this might suggest that the effects of the FMA (2012) guidance are 
misaligned with shareholder protection needs.  
 
6.5 Prelim non-GAAP earnings disclosure by FMA 
 
When prelim differences in proportions are examined (Table 9, below), there is no compelling 
evidence there is a significant difference in the proportion of firm-years where NGEs are 
disclosed, reconciled, or emphasised between pre- and post-FMA (2012) guidance periods. This 
raises concerns about the influence of the FMA’s (2012) guidance in less visible 
communications of non-GAAP earnings. Again, a limitation of the prelim dataset is that 
disclosure Before is not analysed on the basis that prelims often involve the filing of multiple 
documents.  
 




Table 9: Prelim NGEs proportions by FMA (2012) guidance 
This table reports differences in proportions pre- and post-FMA (2012) guidance. To test the 
equality of proportions two-sided Wald asymptotic tests have been conducted. Statistical 
significance in measured at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels, with asymptotic standard 
errors reported in the parentheses below.  
Panel A.  Difference in proportion of non-GAAP disclosures by FMA (2012) guidance N (%) 
         
  
      NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
 
  
Pre-FMA FMA Pre-FMA FMA Pre-FMA FMA 
 Observations 
 
338 126 338 126 338 126 
 N=1 
 
278 107 220 78 144 50 
 Proportion (N=1) 0.822 0.849 0.651 0.619 0.426 0.397 
 Dif (Post - Pre) 
 
0.027 -0.032 -0.029 
 ASE 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
 
         Panel B.  Reconcilable non-GAAP disclosures by FMA (2012) guidance N (%) 
         
  
      NGEs Adjusted earnings 
   
  
Pre-FMA FMA Pre-FMA FMA 
   Observations 
 
278 107 220 78 
   N=1 
 
236 90 178 61 
   Proportion (N=1) 0.849 0.841 0.809 0.782 
   Dif (Post - Pre) 
 
-0.008 -0.027 
   ASE 
 
(0.04) (0.05) 
   
         Panel C.  Non-GAAP disclosure Focus by FMA (2012) guidance N (%) 
         
  
      NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
 
  
Pre-FMA FMA Pre-FMA FMA Pre-FMA FMA 
 Observations 
 
25900 9800 20200 7000 12400 4300 
 N=1 
 
50 19 40 13 17 7 
 Proportion (N=1) 0.193 0.194 0.198 0.186 0.137 0.163 
 Dif (Post - Pre) 
 
0.001 -0.012 0.026 
 ASE 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
  
To summarise the results of sections 6.4 and 6.5, I fail to find evidence there is a significant 
difference in the proportion of firm-years where NGEs are disclosed between pre- and post-FMA 
(2012) guidance periods. Additionally, considering periods where NGEs are disclosed, I fail to 
find evidence that there is a significant difference in the proportion of firm-years where NGEs 




are reconciled between pre- and post-FMA (2012) guidance periods. Using the annual report 
dataset, I find evidence that when relevant NGEs are disclosed, there is a significant difference in 
the proportion of firm-years where these NGEs are emphasised between pre- and post-FMA 
(2012) guidance periods. More specifically, in post-FMA (2012) guidance periods there appears 
to be less frequent NGEs emphasis. This reduction in emphasis appears to be concentrated 
towards EB metrics. As these are the metrics with the least potential for opportunism (Hitz, 
2010), this pattern of adherence to the FMA’s (2012) guidelines might be inconsistent with 
stakeholder-protection needs. 
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Chapter 7 – Multivariate Results and Discussion 
 
Next, I examine non-GAAP disclosure, reconciliation, and emphasis from a multivariate 
perspective.  
7.1 Non-GAAP earnings disclosure 
 
First, I examine the determinants of NGEs disclosure, and the relationship between disclosure 
and ‘fraud risk’ compensation.  
7.1.1 The determinants of annual report non-GAAP earnings disclosure 
 
In the annual report NGEs disclosure model (Model 1 – NGDum), the Cox and Snell (1989) and 
Nagelkerke (1991) coefficients of determinations are 0.189 and 0.312, respectively (see Table 
10, below). According to both measures, a larger proportion of variation in disclosure can be 
explained in adjusted earnings relative to EB metrics. All three models have significant Wald 
Chi-square statistics at a level of significance of 1%.  
Informatively-linked (see subsection 4.3.1) Tech and PriorLoss firms are significantly less likely 
to disclose NGEs. Prima facie, this result seems counterintuitive (and is contrary to hypothesised 
- H 1
65
). On the other hand, it is consistent with the findings of Bowen et al. (2005) that low-
value-relevance firms de-emphasize earnings metrics, instead favouring revenue in their earnings 
releases.  Alternatively, when value relevance is low, firms might favour non-financial 
information.  When NGEs are decomposed, only PriorLoss remains significant in the EB metrics 
regression; I fail to find evidence that Tech and PriorLoss are associated with a change in the 
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 At the front end of this thesis, a complete list of hypotheses is presented alongside a list of tables and a list of 
figures.   
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probability of adjusted earnings disclosure. Conversely, as informatively-linked (inversely) BTM 
increases,
66
 firms are significantly more likely to disclose adjusted earnings. This suggests that 
the probability of adjusted earnings disclosures might also be reduced by revenue-centric 
coverage when value relevance is low. Therefore, both EB metrics and adjusted earnings may be 
less likely when earnings are characterised by low value relevance (informativeness). As 
informatively-linked intangible intensity increases, firms are significantly more likely to disclose 
NGEs (both adjusted earnings and EB metrics). Further corroborating H 1, informatively-linked 
Big4 firms (Big4 is a proxy for the presence of auditor effort) are significantly more likely to 
disclose EB metrics.  
I fail to find annual report evidence that opportunistically-linked (see subsection 4.3.2) MktComp 
is associated with a change in the probability of NGEs disclosure. 
From a regulatory perspective, I find weak annual report evidence that IFRS is associated with an 
increased probability of adjusted earnings disclosure. With respect to disclosure, this 
corroborates the strong univariate evidence in favour of H 4. Consistent with the univariate 
analysis, I fail to find evidence that the FMA’s (2012) guidance is associated with a change in 
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 High BTM firms are synonymous with low growth, and vice versa. 
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Table 10: The determinants of annual report NGEs disclosure 
This table reports estimates for the logistic Models 1-3, where the dependent variables are NGDum, AdjustDum, and 
EBDum, respectively. In their respective orders, these indicator variables are coded 1 when firms disclose non-
GAAP earnings, adjusted earnings, and EB measures, and zero otherwise. Statistical significance is measured at the 
10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below. Types I, O, R and C 
refer to informatively-linked, opportunistically-linked, reporting regime, and control variables respectively. 
         
Variable 
Typ
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-1.153*** 
  
      
(0.16) 
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As the control variable (see subsection 4.3.4) Leverage increases, firms are more likely to 
disclose NGEs, both adjusted earnings and EB metrics. This could be to informatively provide 
earnings metrics more synonymous with cash flows, as above-optimal Leverage incentivises 
accrual-based earnings management to avoid debt covenant constraints. On the other hand, the 
inability to pay down debt could be associated with underperformance that incentivises 
management to strategically disclose. At a level of significance of 5%, as analyst coverage 
increases firms are significantly more likely to disclose adjusted earnings. This could either be 
because analysts find non-GAAP numbers increasingly informative, or because the presence of 
analyst coverage creates strategic earnings targets for management. A similar argument is made 
that institutional ownership could either place pressure on managers to provide additional 
information, or create strategic earnings targets. I find a positive and significant relationship 
between Top20 (Top20 serves as a proxy for institutional ownership) and NGEs disclosure. 
While I fail to find that adjusted earnings are significantly more likely to be disclosed as 
institutional ownership increases, I find that Top20 is positive and significant at a level in the EB 
metrics regression.  
As the control LNSize increases, I find that adjusted earnings are increasingly likely to be 
disclosed.  
In the wake of Reimsbach’s (2014) findings that adjusted earnings disclosures are treated 
differently when coupled with EB disclosures, this study controls for the disclosure of EB 
metrics. At a level of significance of 1%, I find that adjusted earnings disclosures are less likely 
in the presence of EB disclosures. One reason for this result could be that adjusted earnings are 
seen as a substitute for EB metrics. An important feature of these results is that there is variation 
in the determinants of NGEs and adjusted earnings (after controlling for EB disclosure). This 
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suggests that the failure to differentiate, and recognise interactions, between EB metrics and 
other types of NGEs (adjusted earnings) can lead to false inferences about the determinants of 
less-commonly-used, well-defined variants (adjusted earnings).
67
 
Collectively, Table 10 provides compelling evidence that informativeness can motivate non-
GAAP disclosure—some forms of low value relevance also appear to be consistent with 
revenue-centric performance coverage.  In addition, I find weak evidence that IFRS is associated 
with an increased probability of adjusted earnings disclosure.  
7.1.2 The determinants of prelim non-GAAP earnings disclosure 
There is weak evidence that informatively-linked Tech firms are significantly less likely to 
disclose NGEs (Table 11, below). This result is not robust to the decomposition of non-GAAP 
earnings into adjusted earnings and EB metrics. I find that Tech firms are significantly more 
likely (at a level of 5%) to disclose EB metrics. On the other hand, informatively-linked 
PriorLoss firms are significantly less likely to make EB disclosures. Turning to adjusted 
earnings, I find that as informatively-linked (inversely) BTM increases, firms are significantly 
more likely to disclose. Therefore, behaviour consistent with a revenue-centric reaction to low 
value relevance appears across both EB metrics and adjusted earnings. I find that as 
informatively-linked intangible intensity increases, firms are significantly more likely to disclose 
NGEs, both adjusted earnings and EB metrics. Informatively-linked Big4 firms are significantly 
more likely to disclose EB metrics (although only at a level of 10%).  Therefore, there is mixed 
evidence about whether informatively-linked firm characteristics are associated with an 
increased likelihood of NGEs disclosure (as hypothesised in H 1).  
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 This result is robust to the exclusion of EBT (earnings before tax) as an EB metric. 
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Table 11: The determinants of prelim NGEs disclosure 
This table reports estimates for the logistic Models 1-3, where the dependent variables are NGDum, AdjustDum, and EBDum, 
respectively. In their respective orders, these indicator variables are coded 1 when firms disclose non-GAAP earnings, adjusted 
earnings, and EB measures, and zero otherwise. Statistical significance is measured at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) 
levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below. Types I, O, R and C refer to informatively-linked, opportunistically-
linked, reporting regime, and control variables respectively. 
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As opportunistically-linked MktComp increases, firms are significantly more likely to disclose 
adjusted earnings (at a level of 10%).  This provides weak evidence that opportunistic 
motivations are associated with an increased likelihood of NGEs disclosure (as postulated in H 
1). MktComp was insignificant in the annual report dataset. This might be because annual reports 
observe subdued price responses relative to preliminary earnings announcements. For instance, 
You and Zhang (2007) find that relative to 10-K filings, earnings announcements tend to 
generate larger market responses. Furthermore, as more time elapses between earnings 
announcements and 10-K filings, a smaller market reaction to 10-K information is observed. 
The weak annual report evidence of a positive relationship between IFRS and adjusted earnings 
is corroborated by the prelim dataset, where I find that IFRS is positive and significant at a level 
of 1%.  This evidence is well aligned with H 4. The weak univariate evidence that firm-years 
more frequently contain EB metrics post-IFRS does not hold in when this association is 
examined from a multivariate perspective.  
The controls Leverage, LNAnalCov, Top20, LNSize , and EBDum, all display similar levels of 
significance across annual report and prelim datasets, and Cross remains insignificant.  
7.1.3 Non-GAAP earnings disclosure and ‘fraud risk’ compensation 
 
When I run the OLS audit-fee model (Model 13, Table 26 – Appendices), I find that 77.3% of 
the variation in the natural log of audit and audit-related fees can be explained using LNSize, 
Leverage, Loss, INVREC, Big4, Cross, BTM, and IFRS. To the extent that these factors 
adequately control for auditor effort, residuals can then be used to examine whether non-GAAP 
disclosure is a ‘fraud risk factor’. 
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Table 12: Audit-fee residuals regressed on NGEs disclosure 
This table presents the results for model 14. Statistical significance is measured at the 10% (*), 5% (**), 
and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below. For the sake of brevity intercept 
terms have been omitted.  
Panel A: Annual report audit fee-residual regressions     
      
 
NG__ Adjust__ EB__ 
  __Dum 0.182*** 0.181*** 0.016 
  
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
  __Dum*FMA 0.033 -0.001 0.033 
  
 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) 
  
      N 1023 1023 1023 
  R-square 0.0132 0.0208 0.0004 
  
      Panel B: Prelim audit fee-residual regressions       
      
 
NG__ Adjust__ EB__ 
  __Dum 0.17*** 0.133*** 0.005 
  
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
  __Dum*FMA 0.04 0.006 0.111 
  
 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.1) 
  
      N 1015 1015 1015 
  R-square 0.014 0.0115 0.0015 
   
At a level of significance of 1%, the residuals from the audit-fee model are significantly higher 
when NGEs or adjusted earnings disclosure occurs (see Table 12, above), across both the annual 
report and prelims.
68
 This evidence is consistent with auditors demanding ‘fraud risk’ 
compensation when adjusted earnings are disclosed. Put differently, this could be interpreted as 
evidence that auditors concerned about opportunism consider adjusted earnings a ‘fraud risk 
factor’.   
7.1.4 Summary of non-GAAP earnings disclosure 
 
Collating the evidence from Table 10, Table 11, and Table 12, I find evidence consistent with 
both informative and opportunistic motivations being associated with an increased likelihood of 
                                                          
68
 Although it might be that the result in Panel B of Table 1 is spurious because non-GAAP disclosure is highly 
correlated across annual reports and prelims, rather than because auditors price non-GAAP opportunism in prelims.  
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NGEs disclosure (which mirrors H 1). Although evidence consistent with opportunism is specific 
to adjusted earnings, I fail to find evidence that the decision to disclose EB metrics is associated 
with opportunism. Contrary to H 1, I find that some informatively-linked firm characteristics are 
associated with a decreased probability of NGEs disclosure. This suggests that while some firms 
confronted with low value relevance of accounting information respond by using NGEs, others 
might favour revenue-centric or non-financial performance coverage. I also find evidence the 
IFRS is associated with an increased probability of adjusted earnings disclosure (consistent with 
H 4). I fail to find evidence that FMA is associated with a change in the probability of NGEs 
disclosure. While the FMA’s (2012) guidance was not intended to influence the level of NGEs 
disclosure, this contributes towards affirming H 5. Finally, variation in the determinants of NGEs 
and adjusted earnings (after controlling for EB disclosure) suggests that the failing to 
differentiate, and recognised interactions, between EB metrics and other types of NGEs (adjusted 
earnings) can lead to false inferences about the determinants of less-commonly-used, well-
defined NGEs (adjusted earnings).   
7.2 Non-GAAP earnings reconciliation quality 
 
Next, I examine the determinants of NGEs reconciliation quality and the relationship between 
reconciliation quality and ‘fraud risk’ compensation.  
7.2.1 The determinants of annual report reconciliation quality 
 
Informatively-linked Tech firms are significantly more likely to disclose NGEs with high-quality 
reconciliations to statutory profit (consistent with H 2), at a level of 5% (Table 13, below). This 
result holds across adjusted earnings; however, Tech is insignificant in the EBRecon regression.  
Informatively-linked Priorloss firms are significantly more likely to disclose adjusted earnings 
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with high-quality reconciliations. As informatively-linked (inversely) BTM increases, firms are 
significantly less likely (at a level of 10%) to disclose NGEs with high-quality reconciliations. 
This result is not robust to the decomposition of NGEs measures. Similarly, examining adjusted 
earnings and EB metrics shows the formerly negative and significant (at a level of 5%) 
informatively-linked Intang is no longer significant. After decomposition, the informatively-
linked Big4 remains negative and significant for adjusted earnings (contrary to H 2). 
Opportunistically-linked (see section 4.4) ReverseLoss firms are significantly less likely to 
disclose NGEs, both adjusted earnings and EB metrics, with high-quality reconciliation, as 
hypothesised (H 2). 
There is strong evidence that IFRS is associated with an increased likelihood of NGEs (including 
adjusted earnings and EB metrics) being disclosed with high-quality reconciliations (consistent 
with H 4), although it is difficult to rule out that improvements in the reconciliation quality of 
disclosures is simply correlated with the passage of time. This is in contrast to univariate 
evidence where, before controlling for other important determinants of NGEs, I fail to find that 
reconciliation quality has changed post-IFRS. On the other hand, consistent with univariate 
results, I fail to find evidence that the FMA (2012) guidance is associated with a statistically 
significant difference in the likelihood firms will provide high-quality reconciliations. This 
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Table 13: The determinants of annual report NGEs reconciliation quality 
This table reports estimates for the ordered logistic Models 4-6, where the dependent variables are ProRecon, AdjustRecon, and 
EBRecon, respectively. Maximum reconciliation scores of two are assigned when quantitative reconciliations are provided. The 
minimum reconciliation score of zero is provided when non-GAAP earnings cannot be reconciled to statutory profit. Statistical 
significance is measured at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below. Types I, 
O, R and C refer to informatively-linked, opportunistically-linked, reporting regime, and control variables respectively. 
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As LNAnalCov  increases, firms are significantly less likely to disclose NGEs, both adjusted 
earnings and EB metrics, with high-quality reconciliations. This might be because analysts are 
sophisticated stakeholders capable of digesting non-GAAP disclosures without additional 
information. Alternatively, in the presence of analyst coverage, reconciliations might be 
disseminated in another way (for example, through analyst research reports). I find that as 
LNSize increases, firms are significantly (at levels of 5%) more likely to disclose adjusted 
earnings and EB metrics with high-quality reconciliations. This might be because large firms 
face higher media attention. Cross-listed firms are significantly more likely to disclose adjusted 
earnings with high-quality reconciliations, possibly because dual-listed firms face the scrutiny of 
multiple regulators. In section 4.4, it was hypothesised that when the absolute difference between 
NGEs and statutory profit was large, firms would face more pressure to provide high-quality 
reconciliations. I find that as the scaled absolute difference between EB metrics and statutory 
profit increases, firms are significantly less likely (at a level of 10%) to disclose EB metrics with 
high-quality reconciliations. One reason for this result could be that firms with high debt burdens 
do not like to draw attention to this matter by itemising and explicitly stating the values of 
interest adjustments.  
Collectively, annual report evidence is mixed on whether informatively-linked firm 
characteristics are associated with an increase or decreased probability of NGEs disclosure 
containing high-quality reconciliations. Evidence suggests that opportunistically-linked 
ReverseLoss firms are significantly less likely to disclose NGEs with high-quality 
reconciliations. Given Zhang and Zheng’s (2011) finding that reconciliation alleviates non-
GAAP mispricing, one interpretation of this result could be that opportunism is dependent on 
low-quality reconciliations.  
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7.2.2 The determinant of prelim reconciliation quality 
 
In a similar manner to the annual report dataset, I find that informatively-linked Tech and 
PriorLoss firms are significantly more likely to disclose adjusted earnings in their prelims with 
high-quality reconciliations (consistent with H 2). In contrast, as informatively-linked (inversely) 
BTM increases, firms are significantly more likely to disclose adjusted earnings with high-quality 
reconciliations (contrary to H 2). Furthermore, as informatively-linked intangible intensity 
increases, firms are significantly less likely to disclose adjusted earnings with high-quality 
reconciliations. In addition, informatively-linked Big4 firms are also significantly (at a level of 
10%) less likely to disclose adjusted earnings with high-quality reconciliations. Using the annual 
report dataset, I failed to find that informatively-linked firm characteristics are associated with 
the reconciliation quality of EB metrics. Conversely, informatively-linked Intang and Big4 are 
negative and significant at levels of 10% and 1%, respectively, in the EBRecon regression 
(Model 6).    
Consistent with H 2, I find that opportunistically-linked ReverseLoss firms are significantly less 
likely to disclose NGEs with high-quality reconciliations. Unlike the annual report dataset, 
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Table 14: The determinants of prelim NGEs reconciliation quality 
This table reports estimates for the ordered logistic Models 4-6, where the dependent variables are ProRecon, AdjustRecon, and 
EBRecon, respectively. Maximum reconciliation scores of two are assigned when quantitative reconciliations are provided. The 
minimum reconciliation score of zero is provided when non-GAAP earnings cannot be reconciled to statutory profit. Statistical 
significance is measured at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below. Types I, O, R 
and C refer to informatively-linked, opportunistically-linked, reporting regime, and control variables respectively. 
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IFRS is associated with an increased probability that NGEs disclosure (both adjusted earnings 
and EB metrics) will include high-quality reconciliations (as postulated in H 4). At a level of 
significance of 5%, I find that FMA is associated with an increased probability of adjusted 
earnings, including high-quality reconciliations in prelims. Interestingly, prior to controlling for 
other important determinants of adjusted earnings reconciliation quality (i.e., in the univariate 
analysis, 6.5 Prelim non-GAAP earnings disclosure by FMA), I fail to find that a post-FMA 
(2012) guidance difference in the quality of prelim NGEs reconciliations. In addition, FMA is 
insignificant in the annual report dataset (Table 13). This result is also inconsistent with H 5, as it 
suggests that the FMA (2012) guidance may have significantly enhanced the manner in which 
NGEs information is communicated in prelims.  
As Leverage increases, firms are significantly more likely to disclose adjusted earnings and EB 
metrics with high-quality reconciliations, at levels of significance of 10% and 5%, respectively. 
Proponents of H 2 might argue that this is evidence of firms using informative performance 
measures more synonymous with cash flows as leverage increases above its optimal level and the 
probability of earnings manipulations increases. For example, according to the CFA Institute 
(2012, p. 298), “many adjustments for noncash charges that are required to calculate FCFF
69
 
when starting from net income are not required when starting from EBIT or EBITDA.” 
However, if debt covenants are tied to non-GAAP numbers, non-GAAP earnings management 
might be used in place of accrual-based earnings management. Consequently, Leverage could 
also be an opportunistically-linked firm characteristic. As analyst coverage (LNAnalCov) and 
institutional ownership (as measured by Top20) increase, firms are significantly less likely to 
disclose EB metrics with high-quality reconciliations. This might be because these sophisticated 
                                                          
69
 Free Cash Flow to the Firm 
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investors are capable of reconciling EB metrics using the financial statements and supplementary 
notes. As firm size increases, firms are significantly (at a level of 10%) more likely to disclose 
EB metrics with high-quality reconciliations. This might be the result of increased media 
attention. Cross-listed firms are also significantly more likely to disclose EB metrics with high-
quality reconciliations, which could be because of increased regulatory scrutiny associated with 
listing on multiple exchanges. I find that as the scaled absolute difference between EB metrics 
and statutory profit increases, firms are significantly less likely (at a level of 1%) to disclose EB 
metrics with high-quality reconciliations. This supports the weak annual report evidence 
identified.  
7.2.3 Reconciliation quality and ‘fraud risk’ compensation 
 
At a level of significance 5%, the residuals from the audit-fee model are negatively associated 
with the reconciliation quality of EB metrics disclosures (LNEBRecon) increases. Given that by 
definition adjustments to EB measures can be extracted from the income statement or related 
notes, prima facie it is surprising that failure to provide high-quality reconciliations results in 
‘fraud risk’ compensation to auditors. One motivation for failing to provide high-quality 
reconciliations could be to enhance the emphasis placed on non-GAAP earnings relative to 
statutory profit. It follows that the negative and significant (at a level of significance of 5%) 
EBLNRecon coefficient (Table 15) might be related to managers opportunistically electing to not 
provide reconciliations between EB metrics and statutory profit to emphasise the former relative 
to the latter. Accordingly, as this non-GAAP emphasis could have unintentional cognitive effects 
on the decision made by non-professional investors (as argued in section 3.2), auditors might 
demand ‘fraud risk’ compensation. Cready and Mynatt (1991) analyse trading response 
associated with information contained within firms’ annual reports. These authors stratify trading 
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responses by transaction size and find that annual reports primarily inspire small trades, which is 
consistent with small investors relying heavily on this information. This could be one 
explanation for why EBLNRecon is significant in the annual report but not the prelim dataset. 
Alternatively, this could simply be because a number of prelim results are unaudited.
70
 
Table 15: Audit-fee residuals regressed on NGEs reconciliation quality 
This table presents the results for model 14. Statistical significance is measured at the 10% (*), 5% (**), 
and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below. For the sake of brevity intercept 
terms have been omitted.  
Panel A: Annual report audit fee-residual regressions     
      
 
NG__ Adjust__ EB__ 
  __LNRecon -0.107** -0.03 -0.439** 
  
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.2) 
  __LNRecon*FMA 0.057 0.019 0.038 
  
 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
  
      N 842 579 516 
  R-square 0.005 0.0005 0.0098 
  
      Panel B: Prelim audit fee-residual regressions       
      
 
NG__ Adjust__ EB__ 
  __LNRecon -0.082 -0.053 -0.28 
  
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.18) 
  __LNRecon*FMA 0.105 0.086 0.114 
  
 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09) 
  
      N 786 549 434 
  R-square 0.0048 0.0025 0.0084 
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 According to Appendix 1 of the NZX Main Board/Debt Market Listing Rules, Preliminary Announcements 
require a “statement as to whether the report is based on financial statements which have been audited, are in the 
process of being audited, or have not yet been audited”. From this perspective, auditors might have differing levels 
of concern about prelim non-GAAP reporting practices.   
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7.2.4 Summary of reconciliation quality 
 
Evidence suggests that informatively-linked firm characteristics are both negatively and 
positively associated with reconciliation quality. In fact, in EB metrics I only find evidence of a 
negative association between informatively-linked firm characteristics and reconciliation quality. 
These negative associations (which are contrary to H 2) are consistent with informatively-
disclosing firms failing to provide high-quality reconciliations as a means of de-emphasising 
statutory profit.  
Opportunistically-linked ReverseLoss has a negative association with reconciliation quality 
(consistent with H 2). In addition, there is a negative association between the reconciliation 
quality of EB metrics and the residuals from an audit-fee model (which capture ‘fraud risk’ 
compensation for non-GAAP opportunism). Evidence consistent with non-GAAP opportunism 
being negatively associated with reconciliation quality might suggest that non-GAAP 
opportunism is largely dependent on disclosures with low-quality reconciliations. For example, 
as discussed in section 3.2, Zhang and Zheng (2011) find that reconciliations reduce the extent of 
non-GAAP mispricing. Given the nature of my evidence, it is argued that there might be multiple 
mechanisms through which high-quality reconciliation can mitigate non-GAAP opportunism. 
For example, while it is likely that explicitly itemising adjustments might discourage non-GAAP 
opportunism because it exposes managers to legislative provisions associated with misleading 
investors by misrepresenting economic reality, evidence consistent with a negative relationship 
between reconciliation quality in EB earning and opportunism might suggest that emphasis is 
also an important mechanism. On the basis that the adjustments for EB metrics can be extracted 
from the income statement and supplementary notes, it might be that the failure to provide high-
quality reconciliations serves in a big way to opportunistically de-emphasize statutory profit.  
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Findings consistent with both opportunistic and informative (at times) disclosers failing to 
provide high-quality reconciliations to statutory profit to enhance emphasis on non-GAAP 
numbers (relative to statutory profit) might suggest that any regulation requiring reconciliation 
(‘calling noise control’) is a double-edged sword. That is, managers might believe that NGEs 
disclosure (either informative or opportunistic) might fail to gain traction if high-quality 
reconciliations are provided. Of course, this study does not examine the behaviour of investors 
but only the disclosure practices of firms. To this point, it is difficult to trade-off the implications 
of regulation requiring quantitative reconciliations without first considering whether investors 
discount informative NGEs numbers more severely when high-quality reconciliations are 
provided. Therefore, more research on the matter might be prudent.  
Consistent with H 4, there is strong evidence to suggest that IFRS is positively associated with 
reconciliation quality. In addition, in the prelim dataset FMA is positively associated with 
reconciliation quality in adjusted earnings. Therefore, an extension of the argument that non-
GAAP opportunism is largely dependent on disclosures with low-quality reconciliations is that it 
is likely that the FMA (2012) guidance is likely to have reduced the prevalence of non-GAAP 
opportunism.  
7.3 Non-GAAP earnings Focus 
 
Next, I examine the determinants of NGEs Focus and the relationship between Focus and ‘fraud 
risk’ compensation.  
7.3.1 The determinants of annual report Focus 
 
 NGEs Focus has Cox and Snell (1989) and Nagelkerke (1991) R-squares of 0.061 and 0.096, 
respectively. 
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I find that the disclosure of NGEs without balanced coverage of statutory profit (NGEs Focus) is 
significantly less likely in informatively-linked Tech firms. This finding is not robust to the 
decomposition of non-GAAP earnings measures, and therefore may simply be the product of 
noise related to the lack of construct validity associated with representing adjusted earnings and 
EB metrics with a single metric.
71
 As informatively-linked intangible intensity increases, NGEs 
Focus (both adjusted earnings Focus and EB Focus) is significantly more likely (contrary to H 
3).   
I fail to find evidence that opportunistically-linked firm characteristics are associated with NGEs 
Focus.  
From a policy perspective, there is weak evidence (10% significance) that IFRS is negatively 
associated with NGEs Focus. This significance is not robust to the decomposition of NGEs. In 
an annual report univariate context, I find that EB Focus has increased post-FMA (2012) 
guidance, I fail to find any association in this multivariate test. Therefore, I fail to find 
compelling evidence that the IFRS reporting regime is associated with a change in NGEs Focus 
in annual reports. I also fail to find evidence that the FMA (2012) guidance is associated with 
NGEs Focus (consistent with H 5). This contradicts univariate evidence which suggests that 
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 An alternative argument could be that the failure to find significance in ‘pure’ NGEs and EB Focus is related to a 
decrease in power associated with a reduced number of observations.  
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Table 16: The determinants of annual report NGEs Focus 
This table reports estimates for the logistic Models 7-9, where the dependent variables are ProFocus, AdjustFocus, and EBFocus, 
respectively. In their respective orders, these indicator variables are coded 1 when non-GAAP earnings, adjusted earnings, and EB 
measure disclosure occurs in more areas (narrative, table, depiction) than statutory profit. Statistical significance is measured at 
the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below. Types I, O, R and C refer to 
informatively-linked, opportunistically-linked, reporting regime, and control variables respectively. 
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EB Focus becomes significantly less likely as firm size (LNSize) increases. This might be 
because large firms are subject to more media attention, or because they tend to provide highly-
detailed reports—with more opportunity to establish NGEs emphasis while still giving statutory 
profit coverage in each area that NGEs are disclosed. There is weak evidence that adjusted 
earnings Focus is significantly more likely in cross-listed firms. This could be the result of 
different statutory reporting requirements across reporting regimes, which might make 
management more reluctant to give coverage to statutory measures of profit that are only 
relevant in a restricted domain.   
7.3.2 The determinants of prelim Focus 
 
In contrast to NGEs disclosure and reconciliation quality findings (sections 7.1 and 7.2), I find 
that across the annual report and prelims the determinants of NGEs Focus differ materially. 
Using the prelim dataset, I fail to find evidence that informatively-linked firm characteristics are 
associated with adjusted earnings Focus. The annual report dataset only provides weak evidence 
that informatively-linked firm characteristics are positively associated with EB Focus. Using the 
prelim dataset, I find that EB Focus is significantly more likely in informatively-linked 
PriorLoss and Big4 firms. I also find that as informatively-linked intangible intensity increases, 
EB Focus is significantly more likely (this evidence is inconsistent with H 3).   
I find weak evidence that adjusted earnings Focus is significantly more likely in 
opportunistically-linked ReverseLoss firms (consistent with H 3).  
Adjusted earnings Focus is significantly less likely (at a level of 10%) as Leverage increases. 
Also at a level of significance of 10%, EB Focus is significantly less likely as analyst coverage 
(LNAnalCov) increases.  
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Table 17: The determinants of prelim NGEs Focus 
This table reports estimates for the logistic Models 7-9, where the dependent variables are ProFocus, AdjustFocus, and 
EBFocus, respectively. In their respective orders, these indicator variables are coded 1 when non-GAAP earnings, adjusted 
earnings, and EB measure disclosure occurs in more areas (narrative, table, depiction) than statutory profit. Statistical 
significance is measured at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below. 
Types I, O, R and C refer to informatively-linked, opportunistically-linked, reporting regime, and control variables 
respectively. 
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7.3.3 Focus and ‘fraud risk’ compensation 
 
Evidence from Table 16 and Table 17 is consistent with informative motivation for adjusted 
earnings and EB Focus. There is also weak evidence consistent with opportunistic motivations 
for adjusted earnings Focus. In contrast, throughout subsections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 I fail to find 
evidence consistent with opportunistic motivations for EB Focus. Both annual report and prelim 
evidence suggests that the residuals from the audit-fee models are significantly higher when EB 
metrics disclosures are not accompanied by statutory profit.  
Table 18: Audit-fee residuals regressed on NGEs Focus 
This table presents the results for model 14. Statistical significance is measured at the 10% (*), 5% (**), 
and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below. For the sake of brevity intercept 
terms have been omitted.  
Panel A: Annual report audit fee-residual regressions     
      
 
NG__ Adjust__ EB__ 
  __Focus 0.029 -0.018 0.156* 
  
 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) 
  __Focus*FMA 0.037 0.023 0.21 
  
 
(0.18) (0.19) (0.44) 
  
      N 777 519 468 
  R-square 0.0005 0.0001 0.0094 
  
      Panel B: Prelim audit fee-residual regressions       
      
 
NG__ Adjust__ EB__ 
  __Focus 0.099 0.108 0.217** 
  
 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.1) 
  __Focus*FMA -0.151 -0.308 0.026 
  
 
(0.16) (0.21) (0.25) 
  
      N 736 510 383 
  R-square 0.0036 0.0062 0.0148 
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Given that these residuals are assumed to capture ‘fraud risk’ compensation for non-GAAP 
opportunism, evidence from Table 18 corroborates the findings of subsection 7.2.3 where 
evidence is consistent with auditors demanding compensation for emphasis on EB metrics 
relative to statutory profit. This might be related to auditor concerns about the unintentional 
cognitive effects of non-GAAP emphasis on the decision making of non-professional investors 
(as argued in section 3.2).   
7.3.4 Summary of Focus 
 
While the disparity between annual report and prelim Focus regressions might suggest that it is 
appropriate that any results be discounted, below I summarise the findings of section 7.3 taking 
results at face value.  
In summary, I find evidence consistent with informative and opportunistic motivation for EB and 
adjusted earnings Focus. Evidence that informatively-linked firm characteristics are positively 
associated with adjusted earnings Focus is restricted to the annual report dataset, whereas 
evidence that opportunistically-linked firm characteristics are positively associated with adjusted 
earnings Focus is restricted to the prelim dataset. Interestingly, in the annual report dataset after 
controlling for other important determinants of EB Focus, I fail to find evidence consistent with 
the univariate findings that post-FMA (2012) guidance has reduced EB Focus. It is important to 
note that the FMA (2012) only discourages non-GAAP information from being given undue 
prominence, emphasis, or authority; they add that this is a matter of judgement. To this point, a 
stringent definition of emphasis such as Focus is not necessarily aligned with what the FMA 
considers undue prominence, emphasis, or authority. 
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Evidence from this section (7.3 Non-GAAP earnings Focus) reiterates the finding of the previous 
section (7.2 Non-GAAP earnings reconciliation quality) that ‘calling noise control’ to enforce 
rules relating to the disclosure of non-GAAP information might restrict the actions of those 
informatively attempting to ‘turn down the noise’ as well as those opportunistically ‘turning up 
the noise’.  
7.4 Non-GAAP earnings Before 
 
Next, I examine the determinants of NGEs Before, and the relationship between Before and 
‘fraud risk’ compensation. As mentioned earlier, prelims are not considered because they often 
involve the filing of multiple documents.   
7.4.1 The determinants of annual report Before 
 
NGEs Before is significantly less likely in informatively-linked Tech firms, although this is not 
robust to the decomposition of NGEs measures. EB Before is significantly more likely in 
informatively-linked Priorloss firms (inconsistent with H 3). EB Before is significantly more 
likely as informatively-linked intangible intensity increases. NGEs Before (both adjusted 
earnings and EB metrics) is significantly more likely in informatively-linked Big4 firms.  
In opportunistically-linked ReverseLoss firms adjusted earnings Before is significantly more 
likely (as postulated in H 3).  
While there is univariate evidence suggesting there is a higher proportion of adjusted earnings 
Before post-IFRS, I fail to find multivariate evidence that IFRS is associated with NGEs Before. 
Similarly, univariate evidence that there is a lower proportion of EB Before post-FMA (2012) 
guidance dissipates in a multivariate setting (consistent with H 5).  
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Table 19: The determinants of annual report NGEs Before 
This table reports estimates for the logistic Models 10-12, where the dependent variables are ProBefore, AdjustBefore, and 
EBBefore, respectively. In their respective orders, these indicator variables are coded 1 when non-GAAP earnings, adjusted 
earnings, and EB measure disclosures appear before statutory profit. Statistical significance is measured at the 10% (*), 5% 
(**), and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below. Types I, O, R and C refer to informatively-
linked, opportunistically-linked, reporting regime, and control variables respectively. 
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EB Before is significantly less likely as firm size increases. This might be because large firms are 
subject to more media attention. There is weak evidence that NGEs Before is significantly less 
likely in cross-listed firms, although this no longer holds when NGEs are broken down. 
7.4.2 Before and ‘fraud risk’ compensation 
 
I fail to find evidence that the disclosure of NGEs prior to statutory profit is associated with the 
residuals from a traditional audit-fee model. On the basis that these residuals are assumed to 
capture ‘fraud risk’ compensation for non-GAAP opportunism, I fail to find evidence that 
auditors perceive NGEs disclosure prior to statutory profit to be associated with NGEs 
opportunism.   
Table 20: Audit-fee residuals regressed on NGEs Before 
This table presents the results for model 14. Statistical significance is measured at the 10% (*), 5% (**), 
and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below. For the sake of brevity intercept 
terms have been omitted.  
Panel B: Annual report audit fee-residual regressions     
      
 
NG__ Adjust__ EB__ 
  __Before -0.03 -0.099 0.093 
  
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) 
  __Before*FMA -0.094 -0.091 -0.099 
  
 
(0.15) (0.16) (0.28) 
  
      N 777 519 468 
  R-square 0.0013 0.007 0.0033 
   
 
7.4.3 Summary of Before 
 
In summary, adjusted earnings and EB Before are positively associated with informatively-linked 
firm characteristics. Adjusted earnings Before is positively associated with opportunistically-
linked firm characteristics.  
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Again, this suggests that any regulations decreasing non-GAAP emphasis could both ‘stop those 
who turn up their noise too loud, but also hurt those hoping to turn down the noise’.  
This supports the finding of the previous two sections (7.3 Non-GAAP earnings Focus, 7.2 Non-
GAAP earnings reconciliation quality) where it is argued that ‘calling noise control’ to restrict 
non-GAAP emphasis needs to be a cost-benefit decision that considers the consequences faced 
by firms informatively ‘turning down the noise’ as well as the benefits associated with restricting 
those opportunistically ‘turning up the noise’.  
7.5 The FMA (2012) guidance and non-GAAP earnings opportunism 
  
The FMA (2012) guidance note lists one of its purposes as “[to] increase the likelihood that 
financial information is disclosed in a way that is not misleading”. Therefore, a logical extension 
to the results that have been presented thus far is to interact FMA with opportunistically-linked 
firm variables to examine whether non-GAAP disclosures are less likely to be shaped by 
opportunistic motivations post-FMA (2012) guidance.  
For example, in subsection 7.1.2, I find that as opportunistically-linked MktComp increases, 
firms are significantly more likely (at a level of 10%) to disclose adjusted earnings in prelims 
(see Table 11). A relevant question is then: After the introduction of FMA (2012) guidance are 
opportunistic incentives associated with executive compensation being linked to firm market 
performance (stock and options) significantly less likely to shape the non-GAAP disclosure 
decision? I interact MktComp and FMA (MktComp*FMA) and include this interaction variable in 
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Table 21: The determinants of prelim NGEs disclosure, with FMA interactions 
This table reports estimates for the logistic Models 1-3, where the dependent variables are NGDum, AdjustDum, and 
EBDum, respectively. FMA has been interacted with opportunistically linked variables. In their respective orders, these 
indicator variables are coded 1 when firms disclose non-GAAP earnings, adjusted earnings, and EB measures, and zero 
otherwise. Statistical significance is measured at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are presented in 
parentheses below. Types I, O, R and C refer to informatively-linked, opportunistically-linked, reporting regime, and control 
variables respectively. 
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I find that while the positive MktComp coefficient increases in significance,
72
 the interaction 
variable (MktComp*FMA) is negative but insignificant. Therefore, I fail to find evidence that  
post-FMA (2012) guidance there is a significant reduction in the increased probability of 
adjusted earnings disclosure associated with opportunistically-linked MktComp.  
In unreported results, I interact FMA with all opportunistically-linked firm variables in Models 
1–12 for both the annual report and prelim datasets (as in Table 21, above). I fail to find 
significant interactions. In addition, FMA interactions are insignificant in the audit-fee residual 
regressions (Table 12, Table 15, Table 18, and Table 20). Therefore, I fail to find evidence that 
post- FMA (2012) guidance opportunism is less likely to shape non-GAAP disclosure decisions 
(consistent with H 5). Contrastingly, as argued in section 7.2.4, given that FMA is associated 
with an increased probability of adjusted earnings, including high-quality reconciliations in 
prelims, an extension of the argument that opportunism is largely dependent on low-quality 
reconciliations is that it is likely that the FMA (2012) guidance will have reduced non-GAAP 
opportunism to some extent. It is also important to note that the last disclosures considered 
related to December 2013 fiscal year-ends (disclosed early 2014). As a consequence, this study 
only incorporates a limited number of post-FMA (2012) guidance observations. Additionally, it 
could be that the impact of the FMA (2012) guidance takes time to materialise—for example, in 
September 2013 the FMA (2013) published a review of the market’s response to their guidance 
note which suggests areas for improvement.  
 
                                                          
72
 Formerly (Table 11) significant at a level of 10% with a p-value (Pr < ChiSq) of 0.0527, MktComp increases to 
significant at a level of 5% with a p-value (Pr < ChiSq) of 0.0345.  
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Chapter 8 – Robustness Checks, Summary of Findings, and Limitations 
  
8.1 Robustness checks  
  
The inclusion of Tech—recall Tech is based on Kile and Phillips (2009) optimal combination of 
11 different three-digit SIC codes, that cover five separate one-digit SIC industries—as an 
explanatory variable inhibits the use of other industry controls. One natural robustness check is 
to remove Tech as an explanatory variable and instead control for industry fixed effects. 
Following Isidro and Marques (2014), I use one-digit SIC codes to control for industry fixed 
effects.  
Although the year-by-year analysis tends to suggest that IFRS and the FMA might adequately 
capture time-specific heterogeneity,
73
 as a robustness check I also control for year fixed effects. 
For example, key motivations for non-GAAP disclosure could be events such as the 2011 
Christchurch earthquake or reductions in the company tax rate.
74
 Given that the FMA dummy 
variable takes the value one when the relevant annual report or prelim is released on or after 1 
January 2013, it captures all annual reports and prelims relating to the 2013 fiscal year and a 
small number relating to 2012. As a consequence, when modelling year-by-year fixed effects, 
FMA is removed from the list of explanatory variables, and the influence of the FMA guidance 
will be captured by 2012 and 2013 fixed effects.     
 
                                                          
73
 For example, the rapid expansion in the number of firms reporting ‘pure’ NGEs seems to coincide with the 
introduction of IFRS.  
74
Prior to 2009, the company tax rate was 33%; for the income years 2009 to 2011, there was a company tax rate of 
30%, and since 2012 the company profits have been taxed at 28%. 
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Examining the fixed effect regressions (Table 27 to Table 35 – Appendices), I conclude that 
informativeness, opportunism, and IFRS differ in the following ways: 
1) The positive and significant (at a level of 5%) MktComp coefficient in Table 28 
(Appendices) in the EBDum regression (Model 3) provides evidence that, as an 
opportunistically-linked firm characteristics increases, firms are significantly more 
likely to disclose EB metrics in their prelims.  
2) I now fail to find evidence that IFRS is associated with an increased probability of 
NGEs disclosure (Table 27 and Table 28). In unreported results, I find that IFRS 
remains significant after controlling for industry but not year fixed effects. Given that 
the nature of IFRS is largely time-dependent, this could be the result of year fixed 
effects capturing the influence of IFRS. On that basis, I do not discount my original 
conclusion that IFRS is associated with an increased probability of non-GAAP 
disclosure.  
3) While formerly the reconciliation quality of EB metrics only displayed negative 
association with informatively-linked firm characteristics (see Table 14), I find weak 
evidence (Table 29) that informatively-linked PriorLoss firms are significantly more 
likely to disclose EB metrics with high-quality reconciliations.  
4) Weak annual report evidence that opportunistically-linked ReverseLoss firms are less 
likely to disclose adjusted earnings with high-quality reconciliations (Table 13) no 
longer holds after controlling for fixed effects. In the prelim regression, ReverseLoss 
remains negative and significant at a level of 1% (Table 30).  
5) There is now weak evidence EB Before is significantly more likely as informatively-
linked (inversely) BTM increases (Table 33). This is consistent with a negative 
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association between informativeness and EB Before. I also find weak evidence that 
EB Before is significantly more likely in opportunistically-linked ReverseLoss firms.  
6) I no longer find evidence that the residuals from the audit-fee model are significantly 
higher when EB metrics disclosures are not accompanied by statutory profit. 
Therefore, I fail to find evidence that auditors demand ‘fraud risk’ compensation for 
non-GAAP opportunism when EB metrics are disclosed prior to statutory profit.  
7) Weak evidence arises that adjusted earnings disclosures occur Before are associated 
with less ‘fraud risk’ compensation.  
According to IFRS 5 Non-current Assets Held for Sale and Discontinued Operations, a 
discontinued operation represents a component of an entity that has either been disposed of or 
classified as held for sale (IFRS 5.32). NZ IFRS 5.33 necessitates entities to disclosure on the 
face of the income statement the total of the post-tax profit or loss from discontinued operations. 
As a consequence of these reporting requirements, firms often disclose profit (or loss) from 
continuing operations in their income statements. While profit from continuing operations 
represents one alternative measure of performance that managers might elect to emphasise, it 
could be argued that its statutory nature gives managers less discretion for opportunistic 
disclosure. With this in mind, as a robustness check, profit from continuing operations is 
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8.2 Summary of findings 
 
Summarising results after robustness checks, I find that informatively-linked firm characteristics 
are associated with an increased probability of NGEs disclosure (both adjusted earnings and EB 
metrics)—other forms of firm characteristics that have been linked to informativeness are 
associated with a decrease in the likelihood that NGEs are disclosed, which suggests that firms 
might also de-emphasise earnings in favour of revenue-centric or non-financial performance 
coverage. The former (latter) finding is consistent (inconsistent) with H 1 which assumes 
informative and opportunistic motivations are associated with an increased likelihood of NGEs 
disclosure. There is weak evidence that firm characteristics linked with opportunism are 
associated with an increased probability of adjusted earnings disclosed and strong evidence that 
auditors are compensated for the disclosure of adjusted earnings. The latter suggests that auditors 
consider adjusted earnings a ‘fraud risk factor’ and demand compensation for their related 
opportunism. Prior to controlling for fixed year and industry effects, I fail to find any evidence 
that EB metrics disclosure is associated with opportunistically-linked firm characteristics. 
However, after controlling for fixed effects, I find that opportunistically-linked MktComp is 
associated with an increased probability of EB metrics disclosure in prelims. This result is not 
supported by auditor compensation, where I fail to find evidence that EB metrics are a ‘fraud risk 
factor’. To this point, evidence might suggest that adjusted earnings have the potential to be 
opportunistically motivated, whereas there is limited potential for EB metrics to be motivated by 
opportunism. In general, these results raise considerable concern about the use of NGEs as a 
means to mislead investors. Prior to controlling for fixed effects, there is a positive association 
between NGEs disclosure (in particular adjusted earnings disclosure) and IFRS reporting. This 
result is consistent with management commentaries that IFRS fair value treatment is a major 
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motivation for NGEs disclosure. This result is robust to the inclusion of industry fixed effects. 
When year fixed effects are included, it no longer holds. While this result has the potential to be 
driven by events such as the 2011 Christchurch earthquake—events likely to motivate NGEs 
disclosure that occur after the mandatory adoption of IFRS—it is also possible that year-specific 
effects capture some of the consequences of IFRS adoption. After a careful (but subjective) 
examination of the data (including Table 3 and Table 4), I determine that it is likely that in part 
both the former and the latter are true, and concluded that it is likely that IFRS is associated with 
an increased probability of adjusted earnings disclosures (consistent with H 4). 
With respect to H 2, I find evidence that informatively-linked firm characteristics are associated 
with both increased and decreased probabilities of NGEs (in particular adjusted earnings) 
disclosures containing high-quality reconciliations. One interpretation of this result could be that 
informatively disclosing firms fail to provide reconciliations as a means of de-emphasising the 
importance of statutory profit. I also find evidence that EB metrics disclosers with informatively-
linked firm characteristics are less likely to provide high-quality reconciliations. In the 
robustness checks (Table 29), weak evidence was provided that annual report EB disclosures 
where firms have informative ties are more likely to provide high-quality reconciliations. 
Opportunistically-linked firm characteristics are associated with a decreased probability of firms 
providing high-quality reconciliations. In addition, higher-quality reconciliations are associated 
with less ‘fraud risk’ compensation among EB disclosers. Collectively, evidence suggests that 
opportunism is exclusively linked to low-quality reconciliation. Given the findings of Zhang and 
Zheng (2012),
75
 this might suggest that opportunism is largely dependent on low-quality 
reconciliations. This could either be because itemising adjustments that do not reflect economic 
                                                          
75
 That requiring reconciliations reduces non-GAAP mispricing.  
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realty exposes managers to the risk of misrepresentation, or because opportunism relies on non-
GAAP emphasis. One caveat of this result is that while evidence suggests that regulating non-
GAAP disclosure might mitigate opportunism, it is only likely to force informative disclosers to 
emphasise statutory profit in an undesired manner. IFRS is associated with an increased 
probability of high-quality non-GAAP reconciliations. This might suggest that IFRS has fostered 
a culture of informative disclosure in response to volatility caused by IFRS fair value 
adjustments. The FMA (2012) guidance is associated with an increased probability of high-
quality adjusted earnings reconciliations in prelims. Based on the above conclusions, this could 
in turn be used to infer that the FMA (2012) guidance has reduced non-GAAP opportunism.  
With respect to H 3, evidence suggests that adjusted earnings Focus is positively associated with 
both informatively- and opportunistically-linked firm characteristics. Evidence of informatively-
motivated Focus appears in the annual reports, whereas evidence of opportunistically-motivated 
Focus appears in the prelims. I only observe evidence that EB metrics are associated with 
informatively-linked firm characteristics. After controlling for year and industry-specific effects, 
I fail to find any evidence that Focus is associated with ‘fraud risk’ compensation. The 
conclusion that both adjusted earnings and EB Focus can be informatively motivated suggests 
that any regulation imposing the requirement that NGEs not be disclosed with Focus might 
disadvantage informatively-disclosing firms.  
Evidence suggests that adjusted earnings Before is positively associated with both informatively- 
and opportunistically-linked firm characteristics. Prior to robustness checks, I only find that EB 
metrics Before is associated with informatively-linked firm characteristics. After controlling for 
year and industry fixed effects, I find weak evidence that EB metrics disclosure Before is 
associated with opportunistically-linked firm characteristics. After these robustness checks, there 
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is also weak evidence of a negative association between adjusted earnings Before and ‘fraud risk’ 
compensation. This suggests there is a ‘fraud risk’ compensation discount for disclosing adjusted 
earnings Before. One interpretation of this result is that informative disclosers might be hurt most 
by ‘calling noise control’ to restrict non-GAAP emphasis.   
When I interact FMA with opportunistically-linked variables, I fail to find any evidence that the 
introduction of the FMA (2012) guidance has reduced the prevalence of non-GAAP 
opportunism. This evidence is consistent with H 5.  
8.3 Discussion of limitations 
  
Several authors use the standard deviation of return on assets as a proxy for earnings variability 
(for example, Bowen et al., 2005; Isidro & Marques, 2014; Lougee & Marquardt, 2004; Zhang & 
Zheng, 2011) to recognise that highly-volatile earnings might, in part, be a function of noise 
unrelated to underlying performance. One limitation of this study is that it fails to incorporate a 
proxy for earnings variability; however, a compelling argument can be put forward for this 
omission. To measure earnings variability, multiple historical data points are needed. For 
example, Bowen et al. (2005) and Zhang and Zheng (2011) use the standard deviation of ROA 
over the prior eight quarters. Unfortunately, it is not possible to seamlessly implement this 
methodology in the context of this study. Given that no quarterly reporting occurs in New 
Zealand, to measure earnings variability historical earnings must be observed over a number of 
prior years. This would result in a considerable number of lost observations. Additionally, 
measures of earnings variability may be comprised by changes in the make-up of noise and 
underlying performance captured in earnings as a company evolves over time or reporting 
requirements change. Furthermore, given the introduction of IFRS, in the early years after the 
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adoption of NZ IFRS, earnings from a GAAP (pre-IFRS) reporting regime would be used to 
imply post-IFRS earnings variability.  
Jennings and Marques (2011) find that prior to SEC Regulation G, investors were misled by 
NGEs; however, after the introduction of this regulation, there is no evidence that even ex ante 
recurring adjustments nor strategic adjustments that meet or beat analysts’ forecasts misled 
investors. While this study fails to find evidence that the firm characteristics linked with 
opportunistic disclosure incentives are less important determinants of NGEs disclosure post-
FMA (2012) guidance, the study does not consider whether opportunistic disclosures are more or 
less likely to deceive investors  post-FMA (2012) guidance. I cannot rule out that, after the 
introduction of the post-FMA (2012) guidance, changes to the non-GAAP reporting paradigm
76
  
have made investors  less likely to accept opportunistic disclosures prima facie. It is also 
recognised that this study draws on a limited number of post-FMA (2012) guidance observations 
and that the benefits from the FMA (2012) guidance might have taken time to materialise.  
For the purpose of this study, I do not differentiate between adjusted earnings that modify 
bottom-line earnings (statutory profit) or higher-level operating earnings (such as EBIT). That is, 
I treat the disclosure of adjusted NPAT, adjusted EBT, adjusted EBIT, and adjusted EBITDA 
measures as homogenous in nature (see Figure 1). A natural extension to this study could be to 
further decompose adjusted earnings to examine the robustness of this assumption.  
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 One example of this could be the positive relationship between the probability of high-quality ‘pure’ NGEs 
reconciliations and FMA documented in Table 14.  




Chapter 9 – Conclusion and Practical Implications 
 
9.1 Conclusion and Practical Implications 
 
The findings of this research have important practical implications for a number of parties. 
Firstly, this thesis seeks to inform equity analysts and investors about whether they should assign 
discounts when weighting NGEs to recognise that managers might be opportunistically ‘turning 
up the noise’.
77
 Secondly, the findings are relevant to the debate on the quality of IFRS 
information. From a policy perspective the findings of this thesis are used to consider the 
effectiveness of the FMA’s (2012) guidance in mitigating non-GAAP opportunism. I also 
consider the likely impact of implementing regulatory restrictions relating pro forma disclosure, 
emphasis and reconciliation quality (‘calling noise control’). Finally, I decompose contrast two 
types of non-GAAP earnings, this differentiation might help investors identify the types of 
metrics most likely to be subject to opportunism.  
The evidence presented in the previous chapters suggests that both informative and opportunistic 
considerations are important determinants of NGEs. This evidence holds over both adjusted 
earnings and EB metrics, although evidence of opportunistic motivations for EB metrics 
disclosure is limited. This raises concerns that managers might be disclosing NGEs to mislead 
investor perceptions of performance. In the wake of findings that managers might be ‘turning up 
the noise’, it is recommended that investors discount the weights that they assign to adjusted 
earnings relative to statutory profit.  
                                                          
77
 I examine this from two perspectives. Firstly, I consider firm characteristics that have been empirically tied to pro 
forma opportunism. Secondly, I investigate whether pro forma disclosure is an audit ‘fraud risk’ factor.  




I find evidence consistent with IFRS motivating non-GAAP disclosure. I also find that IFRS is 
associated with an increased probability of high-quality reconciliations which suggests that IFRS 
is unlikely to have fostered a culture of non-GAAP opportunism, which appears to be associated 
with a decreased probability of high-quality reconciliation. This revelation suggests that, as 
frequently commentated by firms and the media, IFRS might inhibit statutory profit from 
providing the most meaningful measure of performance.  
While I fail to find the FMA (2012) guidance is associated with a reduction in the importance of 
firm characteristics associated with the importance of  opportunism being important determinants 
of non-GAAP disclosure, reconciliation, and emphasis, I do find signs of a positive association 
between the FMA (2012) guidance and reconciliation quality. To the extent that opportunism is 
dependent on low-quality reconciliation to thrive, this suggests that some benefits of the FMA 
(2012) guidance might have materialised. While evidence suggests that firms with 
opportunistically-linked characteristics might be more likely to disclose and emphasise NGEs, 
but less likely to provide high quality reconciliations, evidence also suggests that a number of 
informatively-linked firm characteristics are associated with similar behaviour. For example, 
some types of informative disclosers might fail to provide high-quality reconciliations, possibly 
to avoid drawing the eye to statutory profit. This suggests that (‘noise control’) regulations that 
restrict non-GAAP disclosure or emphasis, or that require high-quality reconciliations are likely 
to be effective methods of mitigating opportunism; however, they might also inhibit companies 
from informatively sheltering investors from the noise inherent in IFRS earnings. 
Interestingly, while it was found that the disclosure of EB metrics has limited potential to be 
opportunistic, it appears that among EB disclosers some firms use these metrics to 
opportunistically de-emphasise statutory profit. Mechanisms through which managers do this 




include disclosure without reconciliation to statutory profit, disclosure without a statutory profit 
disclosure in the same area, and the strategic placement of EB metrics prior to statutory profit. 
This evidence is a particularly important contribution to the literature, on the basis that these 
measures have been assumed to have relatively limited potential for opportunistic 
implementation (Hitz, 2010; Reimsbach, 2014). This evidence suggests that even simplistic 
measures of performance can be used opportunistically, if they are used as a means of distracting 
attention from statutory profit—this is well aligned with investors making unintentional 
cognitive errors (Allee et al., 2007; Elliott, 2006).  
From a modelling perspective, variation in the determinants of disclosure, reconciliation quality, 
and emphasis across NGEs and adjusted earnings suggests that the failure to differentiate, and 
recognise interactions, between EB metrics and other types of NGEs can lead to false inferences 
about the determinants of less-commonly-used, well-defined NGEs (adjusted earnings).  
Further research could look into the value relevance of exclusions to examine whether investors 
buy into exclusions consistent with non-GAAP opportunism.  
 
 




Table 22: Table of variable definitions 
ABSDif__ 
ABSDifPro, ABSDifAdjust, ABSDifEB is the maximum difference on between non-GAAP 
earnings, adjusted earnings earnings, and EB measure earnings that share the lowest 
reconciliation score for their respective type. 
AnalCov 
AnalCov is the total number of I/B/E/S estimates in the mean EPS forecast, for firm i in year t. 
AuditFees AuditFees is the natural log of audit and audit-related fees (expressed in thousands of dollars), for 
firm i in year t. 
Big4 Big4 takes the value one when firm i is audited by Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, or PWC in 
year t, and zero otherwise.  
BTM BTM is the book value of equity divided by market capitalisation for firm i at the end of the fiscal 
year t. 
Cross Cross is a binary variable equal to one if firm i is cross listed in year t, and zero otherwise. 
EBBefore EBBefore is a binary variable equal to one when firm i discloses an EB measure before statutory 
profit in year t, and zero otherwise. 
EBDum EBDum is a binary variable equal to one when firm i discloses EBT, EBIT, or EBITDA in year t, 
and zero otherwise 
EBFocus EBFocus is a binary variable equal to one when firm i discloses an EB measure in more areas 
(narrative, table, depiction) than statutory  profit, and zero otherwise 
EBRecon 
EBRecon is an ordinal variable equal to the lowest reconciliation score on EB metrics for firm i in 
year t, where irreconcilable EB disclosures have a reconciliation score of zero, reconcilable 
disclosures without a quantative reconciliation have a score of one, and reconcilable disclosures 
with a quantitative reconciliation have a score of two. 
FMA 
FMA is a binary variable that takes the value one when firm i's annual report or prelim (differs 
depending to annual report or prelim dataset) is released on or after 1 January 2013, and zero 
otherwise. 
IFRS IFRS is a binary variable that takes the value one when firm i complies with IFRS in year t, and 
zero otherwise. 
Intang Intang is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets for firm i in year t. 
INVREC INVREC is the ratio of inventory and receivables to total assets for firm i in year t.  
Leverage Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets for firm i in year t.  
LNAnalCov LNAnalCov is the natural log of one plus the total number of I/B/E/S estimates in the mean EPS 
forecast, for firm i in year t. 
LNSize 
LNSize is the natural log of firm i's total assets (expressed in thousands of dollars) for year t. 
Loss Loss is a binary variable equal to one when a firm i experiences a statutory loss in current year, 
and zero otherwise.  
MktComp MktComp is the total dollar value of restricted stock awards and options awards received by firm 
i's executives in year t, divided by their total compensation 
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PriorLoss PriorLoss is a binary variable equal to one when firm i reports statutory losses in both of the two 
years prior to year t, and zero otherwise 
ProBefore ProBefore is a binary variable equal to one when firm i discloses non-GAAP earnings before 
statutory profit in year t, and zero otherwise. 
NGDum NGDum is a binary variable equal to one when firm i discloses a measure of performance other 
than statutory profit in year t, and zero otherwise.  
ProFocus ProBFocus is a binary variable equal to one when firm i discloses non-GAAP earnings in more 
areas (narrative, table, depiction) than statutory  profit, and zero otherwise 
ProRecon 
ProRecon is an ordinal variable equal to the lowest reconciliation score on non-GAAP earningss 
for firm i in year t, where irreconcilable non-GAAP disclosures have a reconciliation score of 
zero, reconcilable disclosures without a quantative reconciliation have a score of one, and 
reconcilable disclosures with a quantitative reconciliation have a score of two. 
AdjustBefore AdjustBefore is a binary variable equal to one when firm i discloses adjusted earnings earnings 
before statutory profit in year t, and zero otherwise. 
AdjustDum AdjustDum is a binary variable equal to one when firm i discloses non-GAAP earnings other than 
EB measures in year t, and zero otherwise. 
AdjustFocus AdjustBFocus is a binary variable equal to one when firm i discloses non-GAAP earnings other 
than an EB measure in year i, and zero otherwise.  
AdjustRecon 
AdjustRecon is an ordinal variable equal to the lowest reconciliation score on  adjusted earnings 
for firm i in year t, where irreconcilable adjusted earnings disclosures have a reconciliation score 
of zero, reconcilable disclosures without a quantative reconciliation have a score of one, and 
reconcilable disclosures with a quantitative reconciliation have a score of two. 
Reconcilable Firm-years where the lowest reconciliation scores are equal to either one or two are referred to as 
reconcilable 
ReverseLoss__ 
ReverseLossPro, ReverseLossAdjust, and ReverseLossEB take the value one when firm i's non-
GAAP earnings, adjusted earnings, and EB metrics replace statutory losses, respectively, in year 
t. 
Size Size is firm i's total assets (expressed in millions of dollars) for year t. 
Tech 
Tech is a binary variable equal to one when firm i has a three digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code equal to 283, 357, 366, 367, 382, 384, 481, 482, 489, 737, or 873  (Kile 
& Phillips, 2009) in year  t, and zero otherwise. 
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Table 23: Annual report NGEs descriptive statistics - complete cases 
Panel A.  Frequency of non-GAAP disclosures 
         
  
NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
 
  
Disc = 0 Disc = 1 Disc = 0 Disc = 1 Disc = 0 Disc = 1 
 N 
 
181 842 444 579 507 516 
 % 
 
17.7% 82.3% 43.4% 56.6% 49.6% 50.4% 
 
         Panel B.  Non-GAAP disclosure reconciliation quality 
         
    
Reconciliation score of two 
  
         
  
NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
 N 
 
529 314 449 
 % 
 
62.8% 54.2% 87.0% 
 
         
    
Reconciliation score of one 
  
         
  
NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
 N 
 
175 127 67 
 % 
 
20.8% 21.9% 13.0% 
 
         
    
Reconciliation score of zero 
  
         
  
NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
 N 
 
138 138 0 
 % 
 
16.4% 23.8% 0.0% 
 
         Panel C.  Non-GAAP disclosure Focus 
         
  
NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
 
  
Focus= 0 Focus= 1 Focus= 0 Focus= 1 Focus= 0 Focus= 1 
 N 
 
619 158 407 112 398 70 
 % 
 
79.7% 20.3% 78.4% 21.6% 85.0% 15.0% 
 
         Panel C.  Non-GAAP disclosure Before 
         
  
NGEs Adjusted earnings EB 
 
  
Before= 0 Before= 1 Before= 0 Before= 1 Before= 0 Before= 1 
 N 
 
560 217 360 159 383 85 
 % 
 
72.1% 27.9% 69.4% 30.6% 81.8% 18.2% 
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Table 24: Explanatory variable descriptive statistic - the inclusion of incomplete cases 
This appendix reports the results presented in Table 5 alongside the complete sets of data available for each independent variable. The 
purpose of this table is to provide a means for comparison so that sample selection bias can be considered. Consistent with Table 5, for 
meaningful interpretation, AnalCov is expressed as the total number of I/B/E/S (Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System) estimates in the 
mean EPS forecast for firm i in year t, Size is the total assets of firm i in year t expressed in millions of dollars. 
Panel A: Summary statistics of continuous variables - complete and incomplete cases 
Variables N Mean Std Dev Min 10th Pctl 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl 90th Pctl Max 
BTM 1178 0.75 0.55 0.05 0.16 0.34 0.61 1.02 1.67 2.09 
Intang 1188 0.16 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.24 0.54 0.85 
MktComp 1027 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 
Leverage 1188 0.48 0.29 0.01 0.15 0.29 0.46 0.63 0.78 1.80 
AnalCov 1188 1.91 2.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 6.00 12.00 
Top20 1188 0.69 0.19 0.06 0.44 0.57 0.73 0.85 0.90 0.98 
Size 1188 709 1476 0 5 23 124 477 2065 7503 
Panel B: Summary statistics of dichotomous variables - complete and incomplete 
cases       
Variables N X = 1 %  
       Tech 1188 140 11.8 
       PriorLoss 1188 263 22.1 
       Big4 1188 977 82.2 
       IFRS 1188 780 65.7 
       FMA 1188 125 10.5 
       Cross 1188 205 17.3 
       
           Panel C: Summary statistics of continuous variables - complete cases 
Variables N Mean Std Dev Min 10th Pctl 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl 90th Pctl Max 
BTM 1023 0.74 0.54 0.05 0.17 0.34 0.61 1.00 1.61 2.09 
Intang 1023 0.16 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.24 0.51 0.85 
MktComp 1023 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 
Leverage 1023 0.47 0.27 0.01 0.16 0.29 0.46 0.63 0.75 1.80 
AnalCov 1023 2.01 2.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 3.00 6.00 12.00 
Top20 1023 0.69 0.19 0.06 0.44 0.57 0.72 0.85 0.90 0.98 
Size 1023 757 1545 0 7 30 144 518 2527 7503 
Panel D: Summary statistics of dichotomous variables  - complete cases         
Variables N X = 1 %  
       Tech 1023 115 11.2 
       PriorLoss 1023 210 20.5 
       Big4 1023 857 83.8 
       IFRS 1023 705 68.9 
       FMA 1023 114 11.1 
       Cross 1023 183 17.9 
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Table 25: Multicollinearity diagnostics 
 
Panel A: Variance inflation factors 
This panel reports the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the independent variables in 
Models 1-3. This is a measure of the multicollinearity between each independent variable 
and all other independent variables. VIFs are based on the 1023 annual report observations 
presented in Table 6. 
      Variables VIF 
    
      Tech 1.22 
    PriorLoss 1.55 
    Leverage 1.08 
    BTM 1.44 
    Intang 1.10 
    Big4 1.30 
    LNAnalCov 2.65 
    Top20 1.09 
    LNSize 3.80 
    MktComp 1.24 
    Cross 1.57 
    IFRS 1.21 
    FMA 1.06 
    
       Maximum 3.80 
    Mean 1.56 
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Panel B: Pearson correlation coefficients 
This panel reports Pearson correlation coefficients between each set of independent variables in Models 1-3. Pearson correlation coefficients are based on the 1023 annual report 
observations presented in Table 6.  
  
PriorLoss Leverage BTM Intang Big4 LNAnalCov Top20 LNSize MktComp Cross IFRS FMA 
Tech 
 
-0.07 -0.06 0.14 0.01 -0.11 -0.02 0.00 0.16 -0.24 -0.13 -0.03 -0.02 
PriorLoss 
  
0.00 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.37 0.01 -0.18 -0.12 -0.05 
Leverage 
   
0.22 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.10 -0.15 -0.02 0.09 -0.09 0.01 
BTM 
    
0.00 0.04 0.34 0.09 -0.35 0.09 0.07 -0.26 0.05 
Intang 
     
0.09 -0.11 -0.13 0.11 -0.02 -0.10 -0.16 0.01 
Big4 
      
-0.09 0.10 -0.26 0.13 0.17 0.03 0.00 
LNAnalCov 
       
-0.01 -0.57 -0.07 -0.13 -0.12 0.01 
Top20 
        
-0.11 -0.02 0.18 -0.09 -0.02 
LNSize 
         
-0.13 -0.34 0.01 -0.04 
MktComp 
          
-0.10 0.00 0.00 
Cross 
           
0.01 0.01 
IFRS 










Time to call noise control?      Appendices        






Table 26: The audit-fee model 
 
This appendix provide the results for OLS model 13. Statistical significance is 
measured at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are presented 
in parentheses below. 
      
  
AuditFees 
   Intercept 
 
-1.717*** 
   
  
(0.15) 
   LNSize 
 
0.486*** 
   
  
(0.01) 
   Leverage 
 
0.592*** 
   
  
(0.08) 
   Loss 
 
0.177*** 
   
  
(0.05) 
   INVREC 
 
1.099*** 
   
  
(0.1) 
   Big4 
 
0.209*** 
   
  
(0.06) 
   Cross 
 
0.367*** 
   
  
(0.06) 
   BTM 
 
0.018 
   
  
(0.03) 
   IFRS 
 
0.234*** 
   
  
(0.04) 
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Table 27: The determinants of annual report NGEs disclosure, with fixed effects 
This appendix reports estimates for the logistic Models 1-3, where the dependent variables are NGDum, AdjustDum, and 
EBDum, respectively. In their respective orders, these indicator variables are coded 1 when firms disclose non-GAAP 
earnings, adjusted earnings, and EB metrics, and zero otherwise. Statistical significance is measured at the 10% (*), 5% 
(**), and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below. The independent variables Tech and FMA 
have been removed and year and industry fixed effects are included. Types I, O, R and C refer to informatively-linked, 

























































































































































EBDum C ? 
   
-1.252*** 
  
      
(0.17) 
  













   
1023   1023   1023 






















Pr > ChiSq 
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Table 28: The determinants of prelim NGEs disclosure, with fixed effects 
This Table reports estimates for the logistic Models 1-3, where the dependent variables are NGDum, AdjustDum, and 
EBDum, respectively. In their respective orders, these indicator variables are coded 1 when firms disclose non-GAAP 
earnings, adjusted earnings, and EB measures, and zero otherwise. Statistical significance is measured at the 10% (*), 5% 
(**), and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below. The independent variables Tech and FMA 
have been removed and year and industry fixed effects are included. Types I, O, R and C refer to informatively-linked, 
opportunistically-linked, reporting regime, and control variables respectively. 






















































































































































EBDum C ? 
   
-1.232*** 
  
      
(0.17) 
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Table 29: The determinants of annual report NGEs reconciliation quality, with fixed effects 
This appendix reports estimates for the ordered logistic Models 4-6, where the dependent variables are ProRecon, AdjustRecon, and 
EBRecon, respectively. Maximum reconciliation scores of two are assigned when quantitative reconciliations are provided. The 
minimum reconciliation score of zero is provided when non-GAAP earnings cannot be reconciled to statutory profit. Statistical 
significance is measured at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below. The 
independent variables Tech and FMA have been removed and year and industry fixed effects are included. Types I, O, R and C refer 
to informatively-linked, opportunistically-linked, reporting regime, and control variables respectively. 




























































































































































































N   842   579   516 
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Table 30: The determinants of prelim NGEs reconciliation quality, with fixed effects 
This appendix reports estimates for the ordered logistic Models 4-6, where the dependent variables are ProRecon, AdjustRecon, and 
EBRecon, respectively. Maximum reconciliation scores of two are assigned when quantitative reconciliations are provided. The 
minimum reconciliation score of zero is provided when non-GAAP earnings cannot be reconciled to statutory profit. Statistical 
significance is measured at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below. The 
independent variables Tech and FMA have been removed and year and industry fixed effects are included. Types I, O, R and C refer 
to informatively-linked, opportunistically-linked, reporting regime, and control variables respectively. 
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Table 31: The determinants of annual report NGEs Focus, with fixed effects 
This appendix reports estimates for the logistic Models 7-9, where the dependent variables are ProFocus, AdjustFocus, and 
EBFocus, respectively. In their respective orders, these indicator variables are coded 1 when non-GAAP earnings, adjusted 
earnings, and EB measure disclosure occurs in more areas (narrative, table, depiction) than statutory profit. Statistical significance 
is measured at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below. The independent 
variables Tech and FMA have been removed and year and industry fixed effects are included. Types I, O, R and C refer to 
informatively-linked, opportunistically-linked, reporting regime, and control variables respectively. 
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Table 32: The determinants of prelim NGEs Focus, with fixed effects 
This appendix reports estimates for the logistic models 7-9, where the dependent variables are ProFocus, 
AdjustFocus, and EBFocus, respectively. In their respective orders, these indicator variables are coded 1 when 
non-GAAP earnings, adjusted earnings, and EB measure disclosure occurs in more areas -narrative, table, 
depiction) than statutory profit. Statistical significance is measured at the 10% -*), 5% -**), and 1% -***) 
levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below. The independent variables Tech and FMA have 
been removed and year and industry fixed effects are included. Types I, O, R and C refer to informatively-
linked, opportunistically-linked, reporting regime, and control variables respectively. 
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Table 33: The determinants of annual report NGEs Before, with fixed effects 
This appendix reports estimates for the logistic Models 10-12, where the dependent variables are ProBefore, AdjustBefore, 
and EBBefore, respectively. In their respective orders, these indicator variables are coded 1 when non-GAAP earnings, 
adjusted earnings, and EB measure disclosures appear before statutory profit. Statistical significance is measured at the 10% 
(*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below.  The independent variables Tech and 
FMA have been removed and year and industry fixed effects are included. Types I, O, R and C refer to informatively-linked, 
opportunistically-linked, reporting regime, and control variables respectively. 
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Table 34: The audit-fee model with fixed effects 
 
This appendix provide the results for OLS model 13. As a robustness check, results 
have also been presented with year and industry fixed effects. Industry fixed effects are 
based on one-digit SIC codes. Statistical significance is measured at the 10% (*), 5% 
(**), and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below. 
  


























































































































Time to call noise control?      Appendices        




Table 35: AF residuals regressed on NGEs disclosure characteristics, with fixed effects 
This table presents the results for model 14. The natural log of one plus the reconciliation score is taken. Statistical significance is 
measured at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses below. For the sake of brevity 
intercept terms have been omitted. Industry fixed effects are based on one-digit SIC codes 
Panel A: Annual report residual regressions 
 
__Dum __LNRecon __Focus __Before 
 NG__ 0.171*** -0.111** 0.018 -0.067 
 
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
 NG__*FMA -0.059 0.147 0.047 -0.097 
 
 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.19) (0.17) 
 N 1023 842 777 777 
 R-square 0.01 0.0141 0.0103 0.0134 
 Adjust__ 0.193*** -0.022 -0.018 -0.114* 
 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
 Adjust__*FMA -0.096 0.037 0.066 -0.038 
 
 
(0.12) (0.17) (0.2) (0.19) 
 N 1023 579 519 519 
 R-square 0.0206 0.0193 0.0258 0.033 
 EB__ 0.023 -0.392** 0.133 0.054 
 
 
(0.04) (0.2) (0.08) (0.08) 
 EB__*FMA -0.042 0.185 0.286 -0.111 
 
 
(0.11) (0.2) (0.44) (0.29) 
 N 1023 516 468 468 
 R-square 0.0003 0.0524 0.0657 0.0594 
 
      Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Panel B: Preliminary earnings announcement residual regressions    
 
__Dum __LNRecon __Focus 
  NG__ 0.167*** -0.087 0.085 
  
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
  NG__*FMA 0.025 0.273** -0.123 
  
 
(0.13) (0.14) (0.17) 
  N 1015 786 736 
  R-square 0.0122 0.0196 0.0179 
  Adjust__ 0.146*** -0.054 0.103 
  
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.08) 
  Adjust__*FMA -0.071 0.271 -0.267 
  
 
(0.12) (0.17) (0.22) 
  N 1015 549 510 
  R-square 0.0119 0.0371 0.05 
  EB__ 0.01 -0.295 0.128 
  
 
(0.04) (0.18) (0.1) 
  EB__*FMA 0.077 0.103 0.089 
  
 
(0.11) (0.2) (0.26) 
  N 1015 434 383 
  R-square 0.0007 0.0659 0.064 
  
      Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
  Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
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